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Radon Gas: Ramifications for Real Estate
Transactions in Pennsylvania
Concern over the presence of radon gas in homes is growing.
Homeowners and environmental officials fear that the odorless, col-
orless gas' that is produced by nature may be accumulating in un-
safe levels in homes across the nation.' At this point, relatively little
is known about the problem.' Moreover, the legal ramifications of
radon's effects in real estate transactions are uncertain." In the next
few years, it is likely that the law's relationship to the radon problem
will be forcibly delineated. Present legal theories will be expanded
and extrapolated5 to answer the question of who should bear the
risks of radon's contamination of a home.
This legal question is particularly acute in Pennsylvania. In De-
cember 1984, it was discovered that a home near Philadelphia had
radon levels far above those ever discovered before. Since that time,
surveys conducted in Pennsylvania have indicated that radon levels
in homes in the state are twice the national average.
7
Although contaminated homes can be found throughout the
state, the chief radon problem exists in the Reading Prong.8 The
Reading Prong is a granite formation that extends from Reading,
Pennsylvania, through several New Jersey counties and into New
York.9 This granite formation contains large quantities of uranium,'
I. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DOE/PE/72013-2, RADON IN THE HOME:
A PRIMER FOR HOMEOWNERS 2 (1986) [hereinafter RADON IN THE HOME] (copy on file at the
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW office); M. LAFAVORE, RADON: THE INVISIBLE THREAT, 21 (1987).
2. Nero, The Indoor Radon Story, TECH. REV., Jan. 1986, at 28 [hereinafter The In-
door Radon Story].
3. "Much of the country has not been surveyed at all, and the surveys that have been
done usually involved relatively few houses." Smay, Radon Exclusive, Pop. ScI., Nov. 1985, at
76, 78. The government also lacks the knowledge that is necessary to give specific advice to the
public. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1986, at A22, col. I.
4. Galen, Lawyers Grapple with the Radon Issue, NAT'L. L.J., July 21, 1986; Sherman,
Radon Testing, Case Law Unclear, N.J.L.J., May 22, 1986, at 22.
5. Galen, supra note 4, at 8.
6. The discovery of the Watras house in Boyertown, PA, is the most dramatic incident
yet to occur in the recent awareness of the radon problem. The radon level in the Watras
family home was discovered to be 100 times that allowed in uranium mines. Smay, supra note
3, at 77. The exposure suffered was equivalent to smoking 135 packs of cigarettes per day.
Galen, supra note 4, at I. This discovery touched off a new awareness and concern for the
radon problem.
7. The Evening News (Harrisburg, PA) Sept. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 4. Pennsylvania has
an average radon level of 6.9 picocuries per liter of air (pCi/I) in homes tested compared with
a 3.4 pCi/I national average. Id. at A4, col. 1.
8. Id. at A l, col. 4.
9. Cohen, Radon: Our Worst Radiation Hazard, CONSUMER'S RESEARCH, April 1986, at
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of which radon gas is a decay product." As a result of this condition,
sixty percent of the homes tested in the Reading Prong had radon
levels above the Environmental Protection Agency safe standard
guidelines. 2 Pennsylvania is therefore considered to have one of the
country's greatest radon problems.'"
In the future, Pennsylvania homeowners will turn to the legal
system upon the purchase or lease of a home which proves to be
contaminated with radon gas. Confronted with a newly purchased
home which may be, in essence, uninhabitable, homeowners may
seek rescission, damages for decreased value of a home or the cost of
a remedial action, and damages for the increased risk of cancer and
emotional distress which may be inherent in living in a radon-con-
taminated home. Although suits have been filed against contrac-
tors,' and more suits can be expected, 15 Pennsylvania appellate
courts have not addressed the issue of a builder or vendor's liability
for radon contamination of a home. Because of this risk, some build-
ers are refusing to begin new housing projects in the Reading
Prong."
This Comment will address the question of radon's effect on lia-
bility stemming from real estate transactions. Although the courts
have not addressed the radon issue, Pennsylvania law is clear in
many areas regarding the duties and liabilities of builders and ven-
dors of homes. This Comment will extrapolate traditional legal theo-
ries and examine their applicability to the Pennsylvania radon
II, 13. Homes with 1,000-2,500 times the average radon level can be found within the Read-
ing Prong. In some areas of the Prong, the risk of death from radon exposure is greater than
the risk of death from riding in a car. Id.
10. Taylor, Your House May be a Death Trap, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 17,
1986, at 64.
1I. The Indoor Radon Story, supra note 2, at 28. Uranium decays into radioactive ra-
dium. The radium in turn decays into radon gas which further breaks down into the radon
daughter solids, which actually cause the health problems. Id. at 28-31.
12. New York Times, Aug. 15, 1986, at A8, col. I. Of the 22,000 homes tested in the
Reading Prong area, over 13,000 had radon levels in excess of 4 pCi/I. Id.
13. RADON IN THE HOME, supra note I, at 17. Other states named in the study are
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, and Tennessee. While these states are reported to have higher than normal levels of
radon, the pamphlet cautiously states that "virtually every state has areas of radon contamina-
tion." Id. (citing Dr. Bernard Cohen of the University of Pittsburgh).
14. Nobel v. Marvin E. Kanze, Inc., No. 83-05253 (C.P. Montg. Co., Pa. filed April 13,
1983).
15. Galen, supra note 4, at 8.
16. Interview with Thomas Gerusky, Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection,
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, in Harrisburg, PA (Oct. 6, 1986)
[hereinafter Gerusky Interview]. It should be noted that Mr. Gerusky believes that providing




The primary focus of liability against the builder will likely be
the implied warranty of habitability," and the Comment addresses
this issue first. Pennsylvania has adopted a liberal theory of builder-
vendor liability for new homes that are later determined to be defec-
tive. 8 Home buyers who discover radon contamination may use this
theory to shift the burden of costs for remedial action to the party
who sold the home. 9 The issue of a home seller's duty to disclose the
presence of radon will also be examined. Pennsylvania courts have
determined that when a latent defect exists, which may cause harm
to a home purchaser, the vendor of the home must disclose that de-
fect's presence." In addition, this Comment will address the validity
of disclaimers, inspection clauses, and statutes of limitations
concerns.
I. Background on Radon
In order to discuss the issue of liability, some background on the
nature of radon and the radon problem is necessary. Radon is an
inert gas. 1 It is odorless and colorless and cannot be detected with-
out the use of specialized devices.2 2 Radon occurs naturally. 3 It is
found in rock and soil formations and is a natural decay product of
radioactive radium and uranium.' These two elements decay and
produce radon gas. The gas then migrates through the soil, diffuses
from the ground, and is released into the atmosphere. 5
Radon can be found everywhere in the atmosphere. 6 Outside of
buildings, however, radon is not found in high concentrations be-
17. Galen, supra note 4; Sherman, supra note 4.
18. See Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972) (Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a builder-vendor impliedly warrants the home sold to be reasonably fit for
human habitation).
19. Galen, supra note 4, at 8.
20. See Long v. Brownstone Real Estate Co., 335 Pa. Super. 268, 484 A.2d 126 (1984);
Quashnock v. Frost, 299 Pa. Super. 9, 445 A.2d 121 (1982); Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa.
Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532 (1974).
21. Calculating Homely Radon's Daughters, Sc. NEWS, Jan. 18, 1986, at 43. Inert is
defined as "having little or no ability to chemically react." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 728 (1967).
22. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OPA-86-004, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO RA-
DON, at 5 (1986) (on file at DICKINSON LAW REVIEW Office) [hereinafter A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE]. Two inexpensive techniques (charcoal canisters and alpha track detectors) are availa-
ble commercially and are listed as "most popular" by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Id.
23. Id. at I.
24. Id.; LAFAVORE, supra note I, at 20-21.
25. Murphy, The Colorless, Odorless Killer, TIME, July 22, 1985, at 72.
26. The Indoor Radon Story, supra note 2, at 28.
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cause it quickly disperses. 7 As a result, outdoor radon poses few
health problems. The problem occurs when radon reaches high con-
centrations in mines or indoor structures. A tightly sealed home can
actually act as a container for radon.28 As a result, radon levels in a
home may increase to the point where severe adverse health conse-
quences occur.
Two major factors determine the radon level of a given home. 9
First, the level of radon is inversely proportional to the ventilation
rate of the building.80 The more ventilation a building has, the less
the gas can concentrate and the less chance radon will become a
health problem. As a result of this factor, new, energy efficient
homes have a greater potential for high radon levels than do older
homes that are less air-tight.3"
The influx rate, or source magnitude, of the gas entering the
home3 2 is the other major factor that contributes to high radon
levels. While radon can enter the home from the outside air, 3 three
other major sources of indoor radon exist. First, radon can seep into
the home through cellar cracks, open crawl spaces, and ground open-
ings for pipes and sump pumps.3' Alternatively, the gas can be
drawn through the porous foundation of a home by naturally occur-
ring air flows within the house.35 In Pennsylvania, particularly in the
area of the Reading Prong, the soil is the major source of radon.36
The radium deposits in the ground produce the gas which seeps into
homes in the area.
The second source of radon in homes is from ground water."'
The radon contaminates the water, and when the water is used in-
27. Taylor, supra note 10, at 64.
28. Nero, Indoor Radiation Exposures from Radon-222 and Its Daughters: A View of
the Issue, 45 HEALTH PHYS. 277, 278 (1983) [hereinafter Indoor Radiation Exposures].
29. Id. at 277-78.
30. Smay, supra note 3, at 79.
31. Indoor Radiation Exposures, supra note 28, at 280. In an energy efficient home, the
radon rates can double during periods when the windows and doors are closed. Id. at 281.
32. Id. at 278.
33. RADON IN THE HOME, supra note 1, at 10.
34. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 22, at 4.
35. LAFAVORE, supra note I, at 39-40, 46. The natural air flow in the home is a complex
pattern of pressure differences. With the basement being a low pressure area, the house actu-
ally draws the radon from the soil. Id.; see also The Indoor Radon Story, supra note 2, at 37-
38.
36. Gerusky Interview, supra note 16.
37. See generally NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASURE-
MENTS, NCRP Report No. 77, ExPOSUREs FROM THE URANIUM SERIES WITH EMPHASIS ON
RADON AND ITS DAUGHTERS, at 52-54 (1984) [hereinafter ExPOSUREs FROM THE URANIUM
SERIES]; LAFAVORE, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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side the home, the gas is released into the indoor atmosphere s.3  Con-
taminated water may also cause severe adverse health effects if
consumed.39
Building materials constitute the third source of the gas.40 Gyp-
sum, brick, and concrete are all made from natural earthen materi-
als and, as a result, all emit quantities of radon gas."' After the
building materials are installed, the gas can diffuse into a home and
cause or contribute to a radon problem." An additional building ma-
terial that can cause increased radon levels is the "fill" used to sup-
port the foundations of homes. If the fill contains byproducts of ura-
nium production, known as mill tailings, the fill can emit large
quantities of radon gas."
While radon levels are difficult to measure with certainty, the
Environmental Protection Agency has established guidelines on
levels of radon in a home that are considered safe."" Levels of radon
in a home are measured in terms of picocuries per liter of air (pCi/
1). The Environmental Protection Agency standard has been set at 4
pCi/ 1.4 At this level, homeowners should be aware of their potential
for a radon problem. At higher levels, the Environmental Protection
Agency recommends action, varying from temporary remedial action
to relocation of residents depending upon the severity of the
problem.4 6
Since radon is an inert gas, it does not react chemically with its
surroundings. The gas can be inhaled and exhaled without harm to
38. See BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL RESOURCES, RADON PROGRAM UPDATE, DRAFT TO RADON PROGRAM CONTROL
DIRECTORS (August 31, 1986) (copy on file at the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW office). Radon is
dissolved in cold water which can be brought into the home. When the water is aerated or
heated, it releases the radon into the air. Activities that result in great amounts of aeration,
such as showers and washing, cause greater amounts of radon to be released into the indoor
atmosphere. Id.
39. Drinking radon water has been associated with leukemia. Smay, supra note 3, at 77,
There is also a suggested link between the drinking of radon contaminated water and stomach
cancer. RADON IN THE HOME, supra note 1, at II.
40. See generally DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, N.B.S. TECH. NOTE 1139, RADON
TRANSPORTATION THROUGH AND EXHALATION FROM BUILDING MATERIALS (1981).
41. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COD-4546-2, MEASUREMENT OF RADON-
227 BUILDUP IN SOLAR HEATED BUILDING AND CALCULATION OF FINAL DOSES, at I (1978);
LAFAVORE, supra note I, at 51-54.
42. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, SYMPOSIUM, NATURAL RADIATION IN
THE ENVIRONMENT III, V.2 at 1211.
43. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 12.
44. Rather than terming a certain radon level as an absolute "standard," the Environ-
mental Protection Agency has established guideline levels with recommended action at certain
levels of contamination. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 22, at II.
45. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1986, at A8, col. I.
46. See supra note 44, and accompanying text.
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humans. 1 The problem comes from radon's decay products. Radon
in the air decays into solid particles or "daughters. s48 These daugh-
ters become attached to smoke and dust particles and are inhaled."9
They later become lodged in the lungs and continue their decay pro-
cess, irradiating the tissue to which they are attached.50 These dam-
aged cells can develop into cancer.51
The extent of radon's health risk is great. It is believed that
when more is known radon will be considered a greater health haz-
ard than formaldehyde or even asbestos.52 At the present time, radon
is believed to be a major cause of lung cancer, second only to smok-
ing. 53 Yet the health effects of the gas are not immediately apparent.
Radon-induced cancers take at least seven years to develop,54 and
have an average latency period of twenty years.55
If a house is found to have a radon problem, the situation is not
hopeless. There are several remedial measures which can alleviate or
control the problem. Control of the ventilation rates or the source
magnitudes can result in a previously contaminated house becoming
safe. Steps recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency
contemplate various means of ventilating the home: covering exposed
earth, sealing cracks and openings in the basement, and ventilating
the soil around the home to remove radon before it can enter the
building.5"
II. Implied Warranty
One theory that will be relied on by homeowners seeking recov-
ery after the purchase of a radon-contaminated home will be the
47. See Calculating Homely Radon's Daughters, supra note 21, at 43.
48. For an excellent detailed description of radon's decay process and the human expo-
sure which results, see Calculating Homely Radon's Daughters, supra note 21, at 43.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Ironically, although some would say pathetically, scientists appear to know even less
about how radiation causes cancer than they generally know about the radon problem. The
radon-cancer link is described as a "growing process gone berserk." RADON IN THE HOME,
supra note I, at 11.
52. Taylor, supra note 10, at 64. Since the circumstances of asbestos and formaldehyde,
being airborne health risks, are similar to radon, comparisons are inevitable. As a consequence,
this Comment will at times attempt to draw on precedents related to these two agents.
53. Galen, supra note 4, at 1.
54. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION POLICY, RESPONSE TO FEDERAL REGISTER RE-
QUEST OF JUNE 27, 1980, FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON RADON IN INHABITED STRUCTURES, at 2.
55. Murphy, supra note 25, at 72.
56. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RADON REDUCTION METHODS: A HOME-
OWNER'S GUIDE, at 4-17 (1980) [hereinafter RADON REDUCTION METHODS]. See also ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/625/5-86/019, RADON REDUCTION TECHNIQUES
FOR DETACHED HOUSES (June 1986) [hereinafter RADON REDUCTION TECHNIQUES].
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implied warranty of workmanlike construction and habitability.57
Many states, including Pennsylvania, have adopted the theory that
the seller of a home impliedly warrants that the home is built in a
workmanlike manner and/or is reasonably fit for the purpose for
which is was sold. 8 Homeowners faced with a radon problem could
apply this theory and shift the burden of corrective measures, or lia-
bility for possible personal injury, to the seller or builder of a
home." They may assert that because of the radon contamination,
the house if unfit for human habitation. Although in many instances
the builder or vendor of the home would not have been aware of the
problem, the implied warranty does not require a showing of fault."'
Rather, it is based solely on the premise that, because the home can-
not be lived in without serious adverse health consequences, it is not
of the condition the seller represented it to be by holding it out as a
dwelling. The issue in this matter is whether the theory will be ex-
panded to cover natural environmental health threats of which the
seller may have been unaware at the time of the construction.61
Prior to the adoption of the implied warranty doctrine, Pennsyl-
vania, like other states, followed the doctrine of caveat emptor. 2 Ca-
veat emptor - let the buyer beware - shielded the seller of real
estate from liability for defects in the homes that he sold. 3 The doc-
trine presumed that the buyer could look out for himself by inspect-
ing the home and insuring that it was suitable."'
57. Galen, supra note 4; Sherman, supra note 4. Implied warranty is defined as "a
promise arising by operation of law, that something which is sold shall be merchantable and fit
for the purpose for which the seller has reason to know that it is required." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1423 (5th ed. 1979).
58. Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New Applica-
tions, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 303-306 (1981). The following states have adopted some form of
the implied warranty: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia
has also adopted the implied warranty. Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia have rejected the
theory. The remaining ten states have yet to rule on the issue. Id.
59. Galen, supra note 4, at I; Sherman, supra note 4, at 22.
60. Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 83 S.D. 57, - , 154 N.W.2d 803,
807 (1967); the seller is the insurer of the safety of the product, even though he exercised
reasonable care. PROSSER AND KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 97 at 690 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].
61. Sherman, supra note 4, at 22.
62. See Wolf v. Christman, 202 Pa. 475, 51 A. 1102 (1902) (caveat emptor applies
unless vendee obtains an express warranty); Pringle v. Rogers, 193 Pa. 94, 44 A. 275 (1899)
(suit on grounds of land not conforming to deed is barred by caveat emptor).
63. For an excellent history of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931)..
64. Id. at 1135. Prior to modern times this assumption was reasonable. The home and
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The problem came, however, with a revolution in the home
building industry. After World War II, mass real estate developers,
who sold the building and the land as a single package, became com-
mon."' Home buyers evolved into buyers of just another product.
Still, courts were reluctant to overrule the long ingrained doctrine of
caveat emptor." As a result, buying a home became very much a
high stakes game of chance.67
A gradual change occurred, however, and courts began to erode
the common law doctrine when its harshness became apparent.68 It
was clear that the potential buyer had no way of knowing the nature
and quality of the home he was purchasing. The builder, on the
other hand, had his own architects and professional advisors who
could examine the home and discover defects that would not be
found by the limited inspection of the buyer.69
As a result, jurisdictions across the United States began to ap-
ply theories, similar to the theories applied to the sale of personal
property, to the sale of real property. The rationale was the lack of
any basis for distinguishing the sale of a home from that of any
other product. Thus, in cases such as Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc.10 and Waggoner v. Midwestern Development Inc.,7" state courts
began determining that an implied warranty arose from the sale of a
home by a builder-vendor. As in a contract for the sale of goods,
72
the land were not sold as one package; the home buyer hired a contractor and an architect to
build the house. The home construction was therefore much more under the control of the
buyer than it is today. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
65. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14
VAND. L. REV. 541, 542 (1961).
66. Id.
67. Hamilton, supra note 63, at 1187.
68. The first exception to caveat emptor in the sales of realty was the establishment of
an implied warranty of workmanlike construction when a home was purchased in the course of
construction. The exception was promulgated in England in Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates,
Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931), and adopted in the United States by Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo.
274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Hoye v. Century Builders Inc., 52 Wash.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474
(1958). See also Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Shedd,
supra note 58, at 293-95.
69. Annot, Liability of Builder- Vendor or Other Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss. In-
jury, or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 392 (1977).
70. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (breach of implied warranty when a water system
provided water of an unsafe temperature).
71. 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (breach of implied warranty when water seeped
into basement of a home).
72. Uniform Sales Act §§ 13-16; U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) require that the goods are
"merchantable" and would "pass without objection in the trade." Section 2-315 provides that
the goods are impliedly warranted to be suited for the particular purpose for which it is in-
tended. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977). "Since the word 'goods,' as used in the Code, is limited to
movable items at the time they are identified to the contract, the sale of real property is not
covered by these implied warranties." Shedd, supra note 58, at 292 (footnote omitted).
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the seller of a newly constructed home and the plot of land on which
it is located holds himself out as having a special ability to provide a
suitable dwelling . There is, thus, an implied representation in the
sale of a home that the home is built in a workmanlike manner and
that it is reasonably suited for habitation. When the vendee relies
on this implied representation and the home is subsequently discov-
ered to be defective, the vendee has a cause of action for damages
against the builder-vendor.
The home builder or seller is not liable for all defects in a home.
Whether or not a home is defective, and therefore breaches the war-
ranty, is determined under a test of reasonableness.7 5 In addition,
most courts have "imposed a reasonableness standard for determin-
ing the warranty's duration.""
Following this trend, Pennsylvania has adopted a liberal view of
the implied warranty of habitability. In the case of Elderkin v.
Gaster," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established that in the
sale of a new home by a builder-vendor, an implied warranty exists
that the home was built in a workmanlike manner and is reasonably
suited for human habitation. 78 In Elderkin, the purchasers of a home
and lot brought suit against the builder-vendor of the home when
their water supply was found to be unfit for human consumption.
Both the home and the well which supplied the water were ade-
quately constructed, but the source of the water was inadequate.7
The trial court held that there could be no recovery." The court
ruled that the implied warranty ran only to the adequacy and the
workmanship of the construction, and not to latent defects which the
builder was unable to control. 81 On appeal, however, the supreme
73. Waggoner, 83 S.D. at -, 154 N.W.2d at 807.
74. Id. at -, 154 N.W.2d at 809; Schipper, 44 N.J. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326.
75. Waggoner, 83 S.D. at -, 154 N.W.2d at 809; Schipper, 44 N.J. at 92, 207 A.2d
at 326.
76. Note, Another Look at the Implied Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina, 64
N.C.L. REV. 869, 878 (1986).
77. 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972). The "builder-vendor" was defined by the
Elderkin court as "one who buys land and builds a home upon that land for purposes of sale to
the general public." Id. at 123, n.10, 288 A.2d at 774, n.10.
78. Id. at 119, 288 A.2d at 773. The plaintiffs alleged that the drinking water from the
well contained pollutants and contaminants that made it "unfit for human consumption, [and]
objectionable because of its toxic effects..." Brief for Appellant at 5, Elderkin v. Gaster, 447
Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972). The supreme court held that the water supply was unfit for
human consumption, and was thus defective. Elderkin, 447 Pa. at 119, 288 A.2d at 773.
79. Note, Elderkin v. Gaster - The Pennsylvania Experience with Implied Warranties
in Sales of New Homes, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 177 (1973) [hereinafter Note, Elderkin v.
Gaster].
80. Gaster v. Elderkin, 56 Del. Co. 467, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 222 (1969).
81. Id. at -, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d at 227.
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court reversed. In doing so, it adopted an implied warranty theory
that was much more liberal than any other jurisdiction at the time. 2
Because the builder-vendor warranted the fitness of the premises, he
could be held responsible for a breach of warranty not only when it
was shown that his construction was faulty, but also when the inher-
ent characteristics of the land somehow made the premises unfit."a
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the builder-vendor in
Elderkin to be liable for a breach of warranty when his properly
constructed building could not provide water that was fit to drink,
despite the fact that he had little control or knowledge of the condi-
tion of the subsurface water.84 The decision has been viewed as com-
ing very close to making the seller of a home the insurer of that
home's quality, and it has been thus criticized.85
Under this liberal view of the implied warranty theory, there
could possibly be liability on the part of a builder-vendor of a home
which is contaminated by radon gas. Unfortunately, such a ruling
could be viewed as unduly harsh. Until very recently, neither home
buyers nor home sellers knew of the depth and nature of the radon
problem.86 The implied warranty of Elderkin does not base liability
on fault, and the theory has been criticized for this reason. 87 In fact,
some jurisdictions have limited the warranty only to the quality of
workmanship to ensure freedom from defective construction.88 A
warranty that the premises are "habitable" has not been implied in
these jurisdictions because the courts recognized that this would go
too far in making the builder strictly liable for defects, and it would
82. The rationale given for this decision was that the vendor and purchaser were not on
an even plane as far as bargaining power was concerned. The transaction was no longer viewed
as one which was carried on at arms length. In addition, the builder-vendor should be liable
for latent defects in the site because he chose the site and because he held himself out as being
capable of choosing a suitable site. Elderkin, 447 Pa. at 129-30, 288 A.2d at 777.
83. Note, Elderkin v. Gaster, supra note 79, at 178.
84. Id.
85. Id; Note, Vendor and Purchaser - Abrogation of Caveat Emptor in New Home
Sales by Builder-Vendors, 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 399, 403-404 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Vendor
and Purchaser].
86. Gerusky Interview, supra note 16.
87. See Note, Vendor and Purchaser, supra note 85. "'Thus the builder-vendor [in
Elderkin] was held to warrant the quality of the subsurface water over which he had no con-
trol under normal circumstances. While it is desirable that the vendee be protected in his
bargain, by this application the builder-vendor becomes an insurer of the land he sells as well
as the house he builds . . . . If an implied warranty is adopted to the injury of the builder-
vendor, then the rationale for the warranty has been completely overlooked. ... Id. at 403.
88. See Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974) (warranty of being free
from structural defects and constructed in a workmanlike manner); Crawley v. Terhune, 437
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969) (construction in a workmanlike manner and use of suitable materials);
Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St.2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966) (home warranted only to have
been constructed in a workmanlike manner).
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be too great of a hardship on the builder.89
Therefore, to a degree, the level of fault on the part of the sup-
plier of homes is considered when the nature and extent of implied
warranties are delineated by the courts. A court, even in a jurisdic-
tion with a liberal implied warranty of habitability such as Pennsyl-
vania, will probably consider the degree of fault 90 on the part of the
builder when determining whether the implied warranty should in-
clude the duty to sell a home which has safe levels of radon gas. For
purposes of analysis, it may therefore be helpful to divide radon con-
taminated homes into two categories, based on differing levels of
fault on the part of the builder-vendor: A) homes which have radon
problems due to structural defects in their construction; B) homes
which are built in a workmanlike manner and are structurally sound
but, because of high natural source strengths, have unsafe levels of
radon gas.
A. Homes with Structural Defects that Cause Radon Problems
The implied warranty of workmanship set out in Elderkin will
likely lead to liability of the builder-vendor for radon contamination
when this condition is caused by defective construction of the home.
Although poor workmanship in itself will not result in a radon prob-
lem, since some natural source strength of the gas is necessary, sev-
eral structural flaws can contribute to high radon levels.9' If the
buyer can establish a causal relationship between the structural de-
fect and the radon problem, recovery would seem logical. 2 A major
defect connected with high levels of radon gas is openings in the
foundation that allow the gas to enter from the soil. 93 Structural
flaws, such as cracks and other openings in the foundation increase
radon entry points, and thus, radon levels in the home.94 Large gaps
89. See generally, Note, Extension of Implied Warranties to Subsequent Purchasers of
Real Property: Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built Homes, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 951, 953-958 (1982) (discussing Mitchem v. Johnson and the rejection of the warranty of
fitness) [hereinafter Note, Extension of Implied Warranties].
90. The term "fault" is used reluctantly for want of a better term. For this Comment's
purposes, it signifies poor workmanship or the lack of care and judgment on the part of a
builder which may result in the home having an increased susceptibility to radon
contamination.
91. See infra notes 93-96.
92. The Elderkin decision pointed out that the habitability of the premises in connection
with the reasonable workmanship must be determined on a case by case basis. 447 Pa. at 126-
127 n.13, 288 A.2d at 776 n.13. Experts and testing devices could be used to determine the
causal relationship between the defect and the inflow of radon.
93. See EPA, supra note 22, at 4; Murphy, supra note 25 at 72; Nero, supra note 2,
diagram at 29.
94. This can be deduced from the fact that the cracks and joints form a point of entry,
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
or inadequate sealing around pipes and sump pumps also allow ra-
don to migrate indoors. 95 Additionally, an inadequate thickness of
concrete block or slab in the basement can cause natural air currents
to draw greater amounts of radon through the basement floors.9 Al-
though the builder-vendor may not have known of the radon prob-
lem, it can still be established that the building was not constructed
within community standards, 97 and thus the home breaches the im-
plied warranty. A link between the defect and the entry of gas would
be the only remaining question.
Such a scenario is readily analogous to the Pennsylvania cases
finding a breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. These
cases tend to focus not on the builder-vendor's understanding or abil-
ity to predict that damage will occur. Rather, the key factor is the
builder's failure to construct the home in a workmanlike manner.98
Thus, liability has been found when a sewage system proved inade-
quate to handle sewage,99 the drainage of a crawl space proved to be
inadequate,100 a gymnasium roof collapsed, 101 and when the granite
walls of a bank slipped loose. 102
In the radon situation, the fact that the builder-vendor has been
unable to foresee that a dangerous radon situation would occur
should be of little relevance. The main factor considered should be
that the homeowner bargained for a workmanlike home and im-
pliedly relied on the skill of the builder.1 03 Instead the homeowner
received a home which was defectively constructed, and consequently
contains a serious health hazard. Although primitive, an analogy will
inevitably be drawn with the cases allowing recovery when cracks in
a foundation leak and cause flooding problems. 04 In both cases, the
and because sealing cracks and openings is a recommended remedy for a radon problem. See
generally, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 22; RADON IN THE HOME, supra note I; RADON
REDUCTION TECHNIQUES, supra note 56; RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra note 56.
95. See supra note 93.
96. Gerusky Interview, supra note 16.
97. The Elderkin case established that "community standards" are to be used to deter-
mine whether or not the home is built in a workmanlike manner. 447 Pa. at 128, 288 A.2d at
777.
98. See supra note Il1.
99. Irwin v. Dorman, 87 York 134, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 118 (1973).
100. Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. II, 476 A.2d 427 (1984).
101. Sports Management Group, Inc. v. Allensville Planing Mill, Inc., 16 Pa. D. & C.3d
760 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1980).
102. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Welton Beckett Assoc., 601 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Pa.
1985).
103. The Elderkin decision stated: "[Olne who purchases a development house ...re-
lies on the skill of the developer that the house will be a suitable living unit." 447 Pa. at 128,
228 A.2d at 776.
104. See Elmore v. Blume, 31 Ill. App.3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (1975); Wawak v. Stew-
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defective construction of the home has allowed a natural condition to
make the home uninhabitable.
The implied warranty theory was relied upon in Nobel v. Mar-
vin E. Kanze.0 8 In Nobel, a homeowner sued a construction firm for
providing his home with an air conditioning-heating unit which
caused his home to have a radon problem. 0 6 The complaint alleged
a breach of an implied warranty because the air conditioning unit,
located beneath the basement subslab of the home, had leaks in its
vents and ducts causing high amounts of radon gas to accumulate in
the suburban Philadelphia home.107 The complaint sought damages
for repairs to the home, for the increased risk of cancer faced by the
home's residents, and the severe emotional distress and inconve-
nience suffered by the residents in having to ventilate the home with
open windows.'0 8
Although the case did not involve an implied warranty in the
builder-vendor situation," 9 it is exemplary of the ready adaptability
of the implied warranty of workmanship to the radon problem. If a
structural defect which causes a radon problem can be found, it is
likely that a homeowner may use such a theory of recovery against a
builder-vendor. The plaintiff, however, must properly plead and es-
tablish the defect, in the form of a structural flaw, before a breach of
the implied warranty of workmanship may be established." 0
Two factors lead to the conclusion that the lack of foreseeability
of the radon contamination would not be an impediment to finding a
breach of the implied warranty once it has been determined that the
home had been defectively constructed. First, in Elderkin, and the
subsequent cases which followed it, the element of foreseeability was
conspicuously absent."' In fact, by its nature, Elderkin dealt with
art, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 83
S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966);
Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co., 36 III. App.2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962).
105. No. 83-05253 (Montgomery Co., PA, C.C.P. Civ. Div. filed April 13, 1983) (cited
in Galen, supra note 4, at 8).
106. It was complained that the levels of radon in the Nobel's home exceeded 50 pCi/I,
over twelve times the E.P.A. recommended guideline level of 4 pCi/I. Complaint filed April
13, 1983, Nobel v. Marvin E. Kanze, Inc., No. 83-05253, at 3-4.
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id. at 5-6.
109. The Nobel case is one in which the homebuyer, rather than suing the person who
built the home itself, sued a components' supplier on an implied warranty of a product theory.
110. The complaint must allege more than general carelessness of construction. A mere
assertion that a warranty has been breached is not adequate. The complaint must specifically
plead the defect with precision. Skretvedt v. The Maple Corp., 62 Del. Co. 86, 72 Pa. D. &
C.2d 637 (1974).
Ill. See Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa.
Super. II, 476 A.2d 427 (1984); Sports Management Group, Inc. v. Allensville Planing Mill,
1125
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
an unknown and undiscoverable defect that was outside the builder-
vendor's control. Further, products liability cases, from which im-
plied warranty theory is borrowed,11 have held that foreseeability of
the particular type of harm is not required.11 3 The seller must only
foresee that some harm could result if the product is defectively con-
structed. In the radon application; the builder-vendor could foresee
that if the home is structurally defective, some damage could occur.
How that harm or damage comes about, or what particular factor
causes the harm, would be irrelevant. 14
Other defects caused by failure to construct in a workmanlike
manner could possibly be found when, in light of increased knowl-
edge of the radon problem, 115 a builder of a home uses construction
methods or materials which could cause or aggravate a radon prob-
lem. Excessive use of building materials that emit radon gas", could
aggravate a radon problem in radon prone areas."" In addition, con-
structing a home with large surface areas in contact with the soil
could also enhance a radon problem." 8 A more blatant construction
defect may be found when uranium mill tailings are used as fill
around a home, as has happened in one area of Pennsylvania."'
A builder must use ordinary care in the construction, planning
Inc., 16 Pa. D. & C.3d 760 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1980); Irwin v. Dorman, 87 York 134, 63 Pa. D.
& C.2d 118 (1973); Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Welton Becket Assoc., 601 F. Supp. 887 (W.D.
Pa. 1985).
112. The liability of the builder vendor is directly drawn from the analogy with chattels.
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 104A at 721.
113. See Eshbach v. W.T. Grant, Co., 481 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1973) (construing Pennsyl-
vania products liability law). See also Blackurn v. Johnson Chemical Co., Inc., 128 Misc.2d
623, 490 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1985); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1985);
cf. Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.
1974).
114. Eshbach v. W.T. Grant, Co., 481 F.2d at 943. "The fact that the [seller] could not
foresee the particular manner in which the harm has occurred is immaterial." Id. (citing
Diakolios v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 387 Pa. 184, 127 A.2d 603 (1956); Vereb v. Markowitz,
379 Pa. 344, 108 A.2d 774 (1954)).
115. Circumstances of construction with knowledge of the radon problem must be distin-
guished from those in which the radon problem was unknown. It would seem logical that the
duty of workmanlike construction can only be breached by using these building methods when
the builder knew or should have known of the radon problem. If the radon problem was un-
known at the time of construction, and the house is otherwise constructed in a satisfactory
way, the use of building methods or materials which aggravate the radon problem is better left
to strict liability in warranty or tort discussed in this Comment.
116. LAFAVORE, supra note I, at 51.
117. "Radon prone" areas is a general term and must be tempered by the fact that even
in "radon prone" areas such as the Reading Prong, one house may have an extreme radon
problem while the house next to it may be totally radon-free. Smay, supra note 3, at 79.
118. Gerusky Interview, supra note 16.
119. In Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, the Department of Energy and the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Resources are presently undergoing a $30 million clean-up project
for uranium mill tailings in and around the town. Id.
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and choosing of a site for a home in order to meet the implied war-
ranty of workmanlike construction."' Under the Elderkin decision,
this would be measured by the standards of the community.12" ' If,
given the present knowledge of the radon problem, a reasonable
builder did not use certain building methods or materials when con-
structing a home in a radon prone area, it may be seen as a breach
of workmanlike construction - and thus a breach of the implied
warranty espoused in Elderkin.
This theory is consistent with present implied warranty applica-
tions. A breach of implied warranty has been found when a home is
not built in a way that will withstand the natural conditions of an
area. 122 For example, many cases have held that construction and
planning of a home must take into account the latent soil conditions
of a plot of land.123 Thus, when a builder impliedly promises to con-
struct in a workmanlike manner, it seems that this responsibility
would include building a home which would not aggravate an ex-
isting natural health hazard such as radon.
The supplying of building materials that emit radon gas is also
directly analogous to other Pennsylvania decisions which hold the
120. See Note, Extension of Implied Warranties, supra note 89, at 958.
A builder is held to a standard of ordinary care except "in the case of an
extraordinarily hazardous transaction." Ordinary care refers to the degree of
care that would be exercised by the average builder. The builder must exercise
such care in the construction of the home and in his choice of the materials and
site for the home. Thus, if the average builder conducts soil tests before choosing
a site, the defendant builder must act accordingly; if he does not, he has con-
structed the house in an unworkmanlike fashion, and the homeowner should be
able to maintain an action against him ....
In assessing whether the construction has been done in an unworkmanlike
fashion, the court must look at two categories: the physical work, and the plan-
ning and selection of sites and materials. One consideration in determining what
constitutes unworkmanlike construction in both categories is the standard of
quality required by usage of trade: what techniques and types of materials would
the average builder use in this situation? If the builder uses the techniques and
materials prescribed by the industry standard, the builder apparently has met
the duties of workmanlike construction and ordinary care.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
121. Elderkin, 447 Pa. at 128, 288 A.2d at 777; Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. II, 19,
476 A.2d 427, 431 (1984).
122. "The primary function of a new home is to shelter its inhabitants from the ele-
ments. If a new home does not keep out the elements because of a substantial defect of con-
struction, such a home is not habitable within the meaning of the implied warranty of habita-
bility." Morrissy, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: Step Toward Protecting Home
Buyers, 23 TRIAL L.J. 137, 148 (1979) (citing Goggin v. Fox Valley Construction Corp., 48 II.
App.3d 103. 365 N.E.2d 509 (1977)); see also Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776
(1974) (a home must be constructed in accordance with workmanlike standards for the area).
123. See Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes. Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978);
House v. Thornton, 76 Wash.2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969); Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo.
274. 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
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builder-vendor liable for constructing a home with potentially haz-
ardous materials. 24 While these cases did not-deal with the implied
warranty theory, they do point out the obligation of the builder to
construct the home with building materials which will be safe to its
inhabitants.
A severe problem would occur, however, because of the fact
that it still must be shown that the excess use of the building materi-
als was not in line with community standards. In the present state of
information, builders in many circumstances would be unable to tell
what building methods are reasonable. Further, use of these building
materials is always necessary in a home to a certain extent. There-
fore, it would be difficult to prove a failure to follow what would be
determined as reasonable community standards.
B. Liability for the Sale of a Properly Constructed Home which
has a Radon Problem
Liability could also be found in the absence of any fault or
knowledge on the part of the builder-vendor. The Elderkin case has
established, in essence, strict liability in warranty.'25 In Elderkin,
the liability of the defendants was not based on the fact that the
builder had acted in an unworkmanlike or inadequate manner. 2 '
Rather, the liability was based solely on the relationship between the
parties and the failure of the builder-vendor to deliver premises that
were fit for habitation. The court stated:
Not only does a housing developer hold himself out as hav-
ing the necessary expertise with which to produce an adequate
dwelling, but he has by far the better opportunity to examine
the suitability of the home site and to determine what measures
should be taken to provide a home fit for habitation. As between
the builder-vendor and the vendee, the position of the former,
even though he exercises reasonable care, dictates that he bear
the risk that a home which he has built will be functional and
habitable in accordance with contemporary community
124. See Pearl v. Allied Corp., 566 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (formaldehyde insula-
tion); Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (lead based paint). See also
County of Johnson Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn.
1984) (asbestos): Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981) (for-
maldehyde carpeting).
125. Prosser treats the implied warranty of habitability and strict liability in warranty
as one in the same. He does, however, point out that strict liability in warranty and strict
liability in tort differ in that the warranty arises from an implied representation by way of a
guarantee while the strict liability in tort arises from the public policy goals of trying to pre-
vent defects. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 95A at 680.




Therefore, under the Elderkin theory, any condition that makes
the premises uninhabitable could be seen as a breach of warranty.128
One commentator felt that the Elderkin scenario was unique, and
that the extent of its warranty would be overshadowed by the basic
implied warranty of workmanship. 129 Applied to the radon scenario,
however, it would seem to imply that a builder-vendor could be held
liable for delivering to the purchaser a home that was defective due
to high levels of radon contamination." 0
In spite of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's strong language,
it is quite possible that the Pennsylvania courts will carve an excep-
tion in the warranty of habitability for properly built homes which
were sold prior to the increased knowledge of the radon problem. 3'
In the case of the vendor who built in a workmanlike manner and
did not have notice to test or take steps to prevent radon gas contam-
ination, the results of a strict warranty application would seem un-
duly harsh. Aside from the inequities involved in holding a com-
pletely innocent individual liable, the economic costs for the building
industry could be great. Because of the cost of remedial actions, the
potential liability for physical injury damages, and the extent of the
Pennsylvania radon problem, the builder's liability could run into un-
justifiably large sums.
For homes sold after the revelation of the radon problem, how-
ever, public policy demands that builder-vendor liability attach.
With knowledge of the radon problem, radon in the construction of a
new home becomes similar to any other latent defect. The rationale
of the implied warranty applies.'32 The builder-vendor stands in a
127. Id. at 128, 288 A.2d at 776-777.
128.
The importance of Elderkin is that the defect, an impure water supply, was not
in the buildings and furnishings ordinarily associated with the builder's liability,
but rather in the condition of the land itself. Thus, the builder-vendor was held
to warrant the quality of the subsurface water over which he had no control
under normal circumstances.
Note, Vendor and Purchaser, supra note 85, at 403. To contrast the Elderkin decision with a
narrower holding on a contaminated well, see Jeanguenat v. Jackie Homes Construction Co.,
576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978).
129. Note, Elderkin v. Gaster, supra note 79, at 178.
130. In the case of radon-contaminated well water coming into the house, it would ap-
pear that the Elderkin case is on all fours.
131. Such increased knowledge in Pennsylvania could be seen to begin after the discov-
ery and publicization of the Watras house in December of 1984. See supra note 6.
132. The rationale for strict liability, both in warranty and tort, is outlined excellently in
Note, Liability of Builder-Vendor: Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 35 ARK. L. REv. 654 (1982).
First, the public interest in human life, health and safety demands protec-
tion against defects caused by the home builder. This protection is maximized by
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better position to test for radon 33 and to take remedial or pre-con-
struction steps to prevent radon from becoming a problem in a home.
While this may seem harsh on the builder-vendor, the converse
would be a greater hardship on the buyer; the buyer is the party
least able to inspect the home and least able to spread the costs of
radon protection across society.134
Further, builder-vendor liability under an implied warranty is
justifiable on two basic factors. First, the cost of taking steps to
lower radon levels in the course of construction is much less expen-
sive than taking those same measures once the home is built.13 5
Therefore, holding the builder liable would place the burden of pre-
ventative measures on the individual who can undertake these mea-
sures at the least cost. This additional cost could be passed on to
purchasers in the sale of the home. Second, because radon has severe
adverse health effects, society should place the burden where the
least human exposure would result. Requiring builders to take pre-
ventative steps during the course of construction would result in less
total exposure of home residents to radon gas.
Even under a strict warranty theory, the buyer may recover
only when some defect in the home can be shown.'36 In the case of a
breach of the implied warranty of workmanship, the defect would be
making the builder-vendor responsible for the defects since the seller is in the
best position to eliminate defects. Expanding strict liability increases the incen-
tive for the contractor to build the house safely, because he can anticipate that if
the work is defectively performed liability will result. Second, the buyer of a
home, whether it be new or used, relies on the builder-vendor's implied represen-
tations that the house is sound. The vendor is an expert in the building profes-
sion, while the buyer usually is not. With today's complicated housing construc-
tion, the builder is the person with the expertise to recognize potentially
dangerous conditions. Third, if the builder-vendor is a mass producer of houses,
he can distribute the loss among all customers instead of having the burden fall
only on the one injured. If the builder-vendor is not a mass producer of homes,
there are fewer consumers to distribute the loss among and he cannot survive
any large judgment because his profits may not be large. The smaller builder-
vendors can, however, purchase liability insurance and distribute the cost of the
premiums to their customers. Fourth, the courts in products liability cases al-
lowed recovery under the strict liability statute because of a policy to reduce
litigation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
133. See LAFAVORE, supra note I, at 122-23. Although there is no "fool proof" way to
predict whether or not a given homesite will have a radon problem prior to home construction,
various "crude methods" for detecting a possible problem have been suggested. Id.; see also
EXPOSURE FROM THE URANIUM SERIES, supra note 37, at 91.
134. Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of Habitability, 53 GEO. L.J. 633, 653
(1965).
135. Gerusky Interview, supra note 16; "Radon-proofing a home as it is being con-
structed is almost always cheaper and less complicated than having to go back and do the job
once the home is completed." LAFAVORE, supra note I, at 122.
136. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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a physical flaw in construction which results in excess radon levels.
In the case of a breach of implied warranty of habitability, however,
the defect would be the presence of radon gas to the extent that the
premises are not safely habitable. The radon gas itself would consti-
tute the defect just as the unpotable water constituted the defect in
Elderkin.
In order to recover under an implied warranty theory, the defect
complained of must be latent. 187 With radon, this latency could eas-
ily be shown. Since radon cannot be detected absent special devices,
the dangerous condition of the premises could not be discovered
under the reasonable inspection required under Pennsylvania's im-
plied warranty law. 138 Due to the inability of the home buyer to de-
tect radon gas, the burden would fall on the builder-vendor who
would have greater opportunities and resources to make a test and
perform corrective measures.
The mere presence of the gas, however, would not constitute a
defect. The builder-vendor is not required to deliver a perfect house
- only one that is reasonably suited for habitability. 3 9 In the case
of a house built in a workmanlike manner, but having a radon prob-
lem, the court would be forced to determine whether or not the
premises are reasonably habitable. For this purpose, radon safety
guidelines established by the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources could be
utilized to determine whether the house is within safe radon levels or
137. Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. II, 476 A.2d at 432 (citing LeDonne v. Kessler, 256
Pa. Super. 280, 389 A.2d 1123 (1978)).
138. Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. at 22, 476 A.2d at 433 stated: "A reasonable pre-
purchase inspection requires examination of the premises by the intended purchaser - not by
an expert. Defects which would not be apparent to an ordinary purchaser as a result of a
reasonable inspection constitute latent defects covered by the implied warranties." (citing
Raab v. Beatty, 96 Pa. Super. 574 (1929) and Stewart v. Trimble, 15 Pa. Super. 513 (1901)).
139. Elderkin, 447 Pa. at 126 n.13, 288 A.2d at 776 n.13. Accord, Waggoner v. Mid-
western Development, Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91
Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
See also, e.g., Gallagher v. White Rock, Inc., 21 Pa. D & C.3d 106 (Frank. Co. 1980) where
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas held that:
Habitability is a term difficult of precise definition. Every minor defect in a
new home does not necessarily make the structure uninhabitable. On the other
hand, the warranty should not be defined in such strict terms as to require the
defect to be of such magnitude as to require that the structure be deemed unliv-
able. Thus, we are required to look at each situation and to analyze the extent,
or magnitude, of the defect and determine whether it resulted in unsuitability for
habitation . . . . Whether or not a particular defect renders the dwelling 'un-
suitable' necessarily requires inquiry as to whether a reasonable person faced
with such a defect would be warranted in concluding that a major impediment
to habitation existed.
Id. at 108-109 (quoting Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294 (Me. 1979)).
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whether it constitutes a health hazard. Although these guidelines
may seem arbitrary, given our limited knowledge of the radon prob-
lem, 140 and although some have criticized them as being overly cau-
tious, 141 they do provide the court with a standard to utilize. It is
therefore likely that these standards would be used by a court to
determine the existence of a breach of the warranty of
habitability. 4"
It must be noted that Pennsylvania also seems to be on the
verge of viewing a newly constructed home as a "product" governed
by product liability law. Strict liability in tort could attach to
builder-vendors. Because mass production of new homes is closely
akin to the manufacture of any other product, many jurisdictions
have held that tort products liability theory applies.
43
Pennsylvania has adopted the strict liability theory of § 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.144 Although the section has tra-
ditionally been held not to apply to real estate transactions in the
state,' 5 this notion is under increasing attack given the modern
trend of products liability application to the sale of new homes.
In Sports Management Group Inc. v. Allensville Planing Mill,
Inc., the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County held that a
claim could possibly be made under § 402A by a buyer of a defec-
tive building. Citing a New Jersey Superior Court decision, 147 the
court stated that "some doubt is cast upon the continued viability"
of a finding that a new house is not a product.4 8 The theory of prod-
ucts liability could apply when the land and the house are sold to-
gether by a builder-vendor.
The adoption of § 402A, as applied to the sale of a new home,
140. The Evening News (Harrisburg, PA) Sept. 26, 1986, at CI, col. 3 (quoting
Thomas Gerusky).
141. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1986, at A8, col. I.
142. In the Nobel complaint, the plaintiffs used the 4 pCi/I standard to determine the
defect. Complaint filed April 13, 1983, Nobel v. Marvin E. Kanze, Inc., No. 83-05253 (Mont-
gomery Co., PA, C.C.P. Civ. Div.).
143. See generally Annot. Recovery, Under Strict Liability in Tort, For Injury or Dam-
age caused by Defects in Building or Land, 25 ALR 4th 351 (1983). For cases applying strict
liability in tort, see Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981);
Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297 (1977); Smith v. Old Warson Devel-
opment Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972): Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.2d
224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
144. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa.
383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
145. See Cox v. Schaffer, 223 Pa. Super. 429, 301 A.2d 456 (1973) (refusal to apply §
402A to the building of a silo).
146. 16 Pa. D. & C.3d 760 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1980).
147. Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297 (1977).
148. Sports Management, 16 Pa. D. & C.3d at 768.
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could have major implications for the radon situation. If the new
home is seen as a product, the builder-vendor could be held responsi-
ble even though he has used the highest degree of care.'"" This tort
liability would seem even broader than the strict warranty liability
put forth in Elderkin. Additionally, the option to use a tort theory
rather than a contract theory would probably result in greater liabil-
ity for the physical harms caused by radon exposure to buyers of
homes. 150
C. Scope of Liability
The builder-vendor's liability could possibly extend beyond the
immediate purchaser of the home. Lower courts in Pennsylvania ap-
pear to have abrogated the contractual privity requirement 5' of an
implied warranty. Two 1974 Pennsylvania Common Pleas cases,
Spencer v. Firanski & Son'52 and Skreveldt v. The Maple Corp.,'53
held that the buyer of a home was allowed to sue the builder-vendor
of that home for a breach of warranty in spite of the fact that the
parties maintained no contractual relationship. 5 4 By so holding,
Pennsylvania appears to have joined the growing number of jurisdic-
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment a (1965).
150. Strict liability in tort is usually used to recover for physical injury while strict lia-
bility for contractual warranty is used to recovery economic loss. PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 60, § 95A, at 680. Although § 402A would seem applicable only to physical
harm, courts have allowed recovery for the defect. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 272 Ark.
185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297 (1977)
(defective sewage disposal); Smith v. Old Warson Development Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo.
1972) (sinking foundation). But cf. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
496 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (in Pennsylvania, an action for damages is limited to dam-
ages occurring to the defective product). See also generally Torts - Strict Liability - Under
Pennsylvania Law Damages Solely to a Defective Product Itself are Recoverable Under Sec-
tion 402A, 27 VILL. L. REv. 836 (1972).
151. "Contractual Privity" is defined as "[t]hat connection or relationship which exists
between two or more contracting parties. It was traditionally essential to the maintenance of
an action on any contract that there should subsist such privity between the plaintiff and de-
fendant in respect of the matter sued on." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
152. 55 Wash. Co. Rep. 7, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 235 (1974).
153. 62 Del. Co. 86, 72 Pa. D & C.2d 637 (1974) (holding that purchase and sale by
realtor did not prevent subsequent buyer from suing under implied warranty).
154. In Spencer, the court stated:
Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing and adver-
tising his product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use. We
have decided that no current societal interest is served by permitting the manu-
facturer to place a defective article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid
responsibility for damages caused by the defect.
Should the builder of a home be in any different position from a manufac-
turer? We think not.
55 Wash. Co. Rep. at 9, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d at 237 (quoting Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler
Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974)). See also Sports Management Group v. Allen-
sville Planing Mill, Inc., 16 Pa. D. & C.3d 760 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1980) (allowing the suit of a
subsequent purchaser under the implied warranty theory).
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tions that have eliminated the privity requirement.155
The abrogation of the privity requirement could have a great
effect on the radon situation. A builder-vendor may not only be lia-
ble to the first buyer of a home, but liability could also attach when
a subsequent buyer undertakes remedial action or suffers a radon
injury. The only factor that would appear to eventually eliminate the
liability of the builder-vendor would be notice of the defect to the
subsequent purchaser" 6 or the running of the statute of limitations.
While the buyer of a used home could not sue the seller of the
home, 57 he would still have the option to sue the builder-vendor if
the radon defect was present when he sold the home.
Pennsylvania has, however, stubbornly refused to expand liabil-
ity under implied warranty to parties other than the builder-vendor.
One buying a radon contaminated used home from the owners would
not have a cause of action against them; he could sue only the origi-
nal builder-vendor - assuming the statute of limitations has not
run.
Pennsylvania decisions have clearly delineated those parties that
could possibly be sued for radon contamination under the implied
warranty theory. Courts have held that private vendors of used
homes are not amenable to suit under implied warranty. 1 8 There-
fore, these vendors could not be held liable even when excess radon
levels are caused by structural defects, or only natural conditions,
unless they somehow misrepresent the condition of the home. Fur-
ther, third parties in the real estate transaction cannot be held liable
unless they expressly warranted the quality of the home. Real estate
155. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Hermes v.
Staino, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d 925 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1981); Moxley v.
Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. MacBrown, 264 Ind. 227, 342
N.E.2d 619 (1976). But see Insurance Co. of No. America v. Bonnie Built Homes, 64 Ohio
St.2d 269, 416 N.E.2d 623 (1980).
156. Notice to the purchaser would destroy the latency requirement of the implied
warranty.
157. See infra notes 160-162.
158. See Boozell v. Bollinger, 20 Mer. Co. L.J. 229, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 247 (1983)
(implied warranty not extended to sales by owner); Firsh v. Fernwood Terrace, Inc., 16 Pa. D.
& C.3d 311 (C.P. Lehigh Co. 1980) (no liability when buyer purchased lot and subsequently
freely contracted with seller to build a home); Ebersole v. Hess, 67 Lanc. L. Rev. 101, 13 Pa.
D. & C.3d 675 (1980) (party who is vendor alone does not impliedly warrant the home); Estill
v. Vandernat, 90 York 133 (1976) (implied warranty not extended to private buyer and seller);
Kline v. Johnson, 47 Northumb. L.J. 135, 70 D. & C.2d 387 (1975) (implied warranty is not
found in the sale of a used home by a non-builder); Henry v. Babecki, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 4
(C.P. Phila. Co. 1974) (implied warranty is not found in the private buyer-seller relationship);
Irwin v. Dorman, 87 York 134, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 118 (1973) (non-builder of used home does
not impliedly warranty habitability). But see Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (implied warranty may apply to a reconditioner vendor as well as a builder-vendor).
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brokers,'159 home financers,"' and relocation services1 6' are not liable
for defects in a home under an implied warranty theory. The modern
trend of extending the implied warranty to the sale of commercial
dwellings appears to be the only expansion of the doctrine. 62
D. Leased Premises
The implied warranty of habitability theory is also available to
persons leasing premises that are found to be contaminated by radon
gas. While radon gas could conceivably collect in apartments, it is
not presently a serious problem in Pennsylvania.' 63 Because most
apartments are not in direct contact with the ground, 64 and because
air flow between lower level apartments and higher level apartments
is restricted, apartments are relatively free of radon gas due to natu-
ral factors. The possibility still exists, however, that individuals rent-
ing housing or duplex homes, which are in contact with the ground,
may bring suit for rescission of their lease, rent reduction, or dam-
ages for their radon exposure.1 5
Pennsylvania has established an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in residential leases which is similar to the warranty put forth in
159. Cf. Rattigan v. Cooke, 21 Ches. Co. Rep. 224 (1973) (agent is not liable on con-
tract of a disclosed principle unless agent personally assumed obligations).
160. See 1000 Grandview Ass'n, Inc. v. Mount Washington Assocs., 290 Pa. Super. 365,
434 A.2d 796 (1981) (lender of construction money for condominium could not be sued on
implied warranty). See also Scott v. First Investment Corp., 556 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Pa.
1983) (investment corporation cannot be sued for breach of implied warranty in the sale of a
home).
161. See Best v. Hammill Quinlan Realty Co., Inc., 61 Wash. Co. Rep. 126, 18 Pa. D.
& C.3d 31 (1981).
162. See Sports Management Group, Inc. v. Allensville Planing Mill, Inc., 16 Pa. D. &
C.3d 760 (C.P. Mifflin Co. 1980) (implied warranty extended to gymnasium). See also Pitts-
burgh Nat'l Bank v. Welton Beckett Assoc., 601 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (implied
warranty extended to bank).
163. Gerusky Interview, supra note 16.
164. The Indoor Radon Story. supra note 2, at 36.
165. While no Pennsylvania implied warranty cases have dealt with personal injury
damages, courts have held that where a tort cause of action can be found in the relationship
between the parties, the tenant is free to pursue damages under those theories. See Fair v.
Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978) (recovery may lie for intentional infliction of
emotional distress if the requisite intent can be shown). See also Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa.
Super. 208, 389 A.2d 1087 (1978). Other jurisdictions have held that if an injury is caused by
a defect in the premises, damages for that injury may be recovered. See Mansur v. Eubanks,
701 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1981); Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). See also
Annotation, Modern Status of Landlord's Tort Liability for Injury or Death of Tenant or
Third Person Caused by Dangerous Condition of Premises, 64 A.L.R.3d 339 (1975). Recovery
for radon injury under an implied warranty in a lease would seem doubtful when the circum-
stances are considered. Since notice of the defect is required, if the tenant was the first to
know of the condition, the landlord would not have been in breach prior to the discovery.
Damages after discovery would be attributable to the tenant because he stayed in the home. If
the landlord knew of the defect and rented the premises anyway, tort theories such as battery
would probably be more effective than the implied warranty.
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Elderkin. In Pugh v. Holmes,'66 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
citing cases from other jurisdictions, emphasized that all residen-
tial 6 7 leases contain an implied warranty that the premises are rea-
sonably suited for human inhabitance. 6 8 In Pugh, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of caveat emptor in our soci-
ety has "outlived its usefulness and must be abolished."1 9 Caveat
emptor was well suited for an agrarian society where the land was
the major item of any lease, but today the focal point of a lease is
the shelter that it provides.170 The inferior bargaining position of the
tenant presently makes it necessary for the law to step in and apply
an implied warranty that the premises are fit to be occupied.17'
It is important to note that before the tenant can claim a breach
of the implied warranty under Pugh, the tenant must give notice to
the landlord of a defect "of a kind and nature that will prevent the
use of the dwelling for its intended purpose."' 72 Additionally, the
landlord must be given an opportunity to correct the defect.
173
Therefore, a tenant of a leased home claiming a breach of implied
warranty because of radon contamination would bear the burden of
testing for radon. If the test levels proved unsafe, the tenant would
be forced to give the landlord reasonable time to take remedial mea-
sures before the breach could be claimed.
It seems clear that high radon levels would be a defect that
would make a rented home uninhabitable. The court in Pugh stated
that "at a minimum, this means the [leased] premises must be safe
166. 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979). In Pugh, a tenant who was sued for back rent
set up the implied warranty theory as a defense.
167. The implied warranty has also been applied to leased vacation homes, Beausang v.
Bernotos, 296 Pa. Super. 335, 442 A.2d 797 (1982), and commercial premises, C and B En-
ters. v. Intercarbon Coal Co., 42 Som. L.J. 288, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 285 (1985).
168. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 281, 405 A.2d at 900. More than forty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of the implied warranty of habitability in leased premises.
Id. at 281, 405 A.2d at 901. The seminal case on this issue is Javins v. First National Realty
Co., 428 F.2d 1071, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (defense of implied warranty of habita-
bility allowed in rent collection action in the District of Columbia). See generally, Annotation,
Modern Status of Rules as to Existence of Implied Warranty of Habitability or Fitness for
Use of Leased Premises, 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971).
169. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 279, 405 A.2d at 900.
170. Id. at 280, 405 A.2d at 901.
171. Id. at 282-83, 405 A.2d at 902. With todays large cities and housing shortages, the
tenant is often forced to accept premises which are vastly substandard. Id. (citing Reitmeyer v.
Sprecker, 431 Pa. 284, 289-90, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (1985).
172. Id. at 289-90, 405 A.2d at 906. Accord Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa. Super. 208,
389 A.2d 1087 (1978). "[l~n order to succeed on their complaint [in implied warranty, the
tenants] must prove that they gave notice of the defective conditions, that [the landlord] had a




.... -174 By showing that radon levels are above the Environmental
Protection Agency and Department of Environmental Resources rec-
ommended guideline levels, 17 1 it could be shown that the premises
are not safe, and thus uninhabitable.
Once the tenant shows that radon levels are unsafe, and that
notice and an opportunity to correct has been given to the landlord,
various remedies are available to the tenant. The tenant may with-
hold rent. 176 Decisions prior to Pugh held that the covenant to pay
rent is dependent upon the landlord's covenant to repair the prem-
ises.177 Consequently, the court in Pugh held that if the implied war-
ranty of habitability is breached, the tenant may withhold rent pay-
ments until the premises are repaired.17 8 If rent was paid, the tenant
is entitled to the return of the difference between the rent paid and
the fair rental value of the premises for the period that the defect
made the premises uninhabitable.1 79 In the case of radon, the tenant
would probably be freed from paying any rent because the entire
premises would be uninhabitable.180 If the rent was paid unwittingly
after notice to the landlord, the tenant could recover this rent.
The repair and deduct alternative"'8 would probably be inappli-
cable to many radon cases. The cost of repairing and deducting may
be greater than the total rent due for the term of the lease. With the
high costs of many radon remedial measures,'82 this alternative
would often be precluded. The more logical option would be to va-
cate the premises and terminate the lease.
Application of the implied warranty to radon contaminated
174. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 289, 405 A.2d at 905.
175. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
176. Pugh, at 292, 405 A.2d at 907. The court refused to adopt a mandatory require-
ment that the tenant escrow the rent pending disposition of the case. Id.
177. See McDanel v. Mack Realty Co., 315 Pa. 174, 172 A. 97 (1934). A "dependent
covenant" is defined as a covenant that "depends on the prior performance of some act or
condition, and, until the condition is performed, the other party is not liable to an action on his
covenant." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (5th ed. 1979).
178. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 292, 405 A.2d at 907.
179. Id.; see also Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 54, 390 A.2d 240, 242 (1978).
Accord Beasley v. Freedman, 256 Pa. Super. 208, 389 A.2d 1087 (1978).
180. In most circumstances it could be argued that a home with unsafe radon levels
would have a fair market value of zero. Certain areas of the home which are located farther
away from the ground, however, may have safe radon levels. It is therefore possible that some
parts of the home could be occupied and a percentage reduction in rent formula could be used.
Further, mitigation techniques, such as increased ventilation through open windows, may allow
some areas of the home to be used. Some portions of the home could be habitable. A cause of
action would still exist, however, because the value of the premises is less than that bargained
for in the lease.
181. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 293, 405 A.2d at 907.
182. The cost to "radon proof" a home averages between $1,000 and $5,000. Murphy,
supra note 25.
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leased premises would be equitable. 18 Pennsylvania has determined
that the landlord should bear the burden of making premises habita-
ble. Because notice of the defect must be given to the landlord, the
fact that radon is a newly discovered and naturally occurring prob-
lem would be of little consequence. The landlord would have to be
informed of the problem and given an opportunity to correct the sit-
uation through remedial measures. Therefore, under the circum-
stances, radon contamination would be indistinguishable from other
defects.
III. Fraud and the Duty to Disclose
Buyers of radon contaminated homes may also resort to fraud
theories of recovery when the seller either knew of a radon problem
or represented that there was no radon problem. The situation may
be broken down into three basic categories: 1) where the seller knew
of the radon problem and represented that it did not exist; 2) where
the seller represented that there was no radon problem but failed to
actually test the home to determine the truth of his statement; or 3)
where the seller knew of the radon problem but failed to disclose this
condition to the buyer.
A. Misrepresentation of a Known Radon Condition
Pennsylvania, like other jurisdictions, 84 holds that an action for
fraud' 85 or deceit will lie when, in a business transaction, the seller
knowingly misrepresents the quality of the merchandise that he is
selling. To find actionable fraud in a transaction, the plaintiff must
establish that there was 1) a misrepresentation, 2) a fraudulent ut-
terance of that misrepresentation, 3) an intention to induce reliance,
4) justifiable reliance on the part of the buyer, and 5) damage as a
183. Pennsylvania has shown some sympathy, however, in not holding the landlord liable
for incidents over which he has little control. In Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742
(1984), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to hold the landlord liable for the negligent
failure to prevent criminal acts. This holding is contrary to the modern trend. See Trentacost
v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Co., 439
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Feld decision indicates some willingness of Pennsylvania
courts not to place undue burdens upon the landlord.
184. All jurisdictions hold that the misrepresentation of matters material to a transac-
tion will result in liability on the part of the seller. Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for
the Purchase of a Defective Home, 49 J. URB. L. 533, 534 (1972).
185. Fraud is defined as "[an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing
another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a
legal right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979). Fraud is a separate concept from
warranty and should not be confused with it as a basis for recovery. 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW
ENCYCLOPEDIA Fraud § 1 (1959).
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proximate result. 186 A misrepresentation in a business matter is
"fraudulent" when the maker knows or has reason to know that the
condition of the item being sold is different from that being repre-
sented. 87 The fraud need not be expressed in words. Any act that is
calculated to deceive, no matter what the form, can constitute a
fraud if it has the effect of making the buyer believe that the condi-
tion is other than as it really exists.' 88 Therefore, a generalized state-
ment of the condition of a home being sold may amount to a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation when there is a latent condition that may
make the statement false. Statements that the home is in "A-1 con-
dition," '89 that the basement joists are "as good as new,"' 90 and that
the floors are in good condition' 91 have all been held to be fraudulent
misrepresentations.
The sale of a home contaminated with radon, coupled with
knowledge on the part of the seller that the condition exists, would
be fraudulent if the seller in any way represented the building as a
safe dwelling. A statement that the home would be suitable for occu-
pation or that the home contains no latent or hazardous conditions
would be the utterance of a known falsity and would, thus, be ac-
tionable fraud or deceit.
A representation on the part of the seller that the home does not
have a radon problem would indicate a higher degree of culpability.
Many banks and real estate brokers now require radon disclosure
forms. 92 A misrepresentation on these forms would be clear fraud
actionable by the buyer.' 9 Additionally, improper measurement and
reporting of a radon test, that is "calculated to deceive," would be
actionable. Radon levels vary in different areas of the home. 94 Tak-
ing radon measurements from one area of the home that is known to
186. Neuman v. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 356 Pa. 442, 450, 51 A.2d
759, 763 (1947). See also 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Fraud § 2 (1959).
187. Neuman, 356 Pa. at 451, 51 A.2d at 764.
188. Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 425 A.2d 412 (1981). See PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 60, § 106 at 736.
189. Borelli v. Barthel, 205 Pa. Super. 442, 211 A.2d 11 (1965).
190. DeJoseph v. Zambelli, 329 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644 (1958).
191. Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffman, 397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d 363 (1959).
192. The Evening News, Harrisburg, Pa., Sept. 26, 1986 at Cl, col. 6; Galen, supra
note 4, at 10; Taylor, supra note 10.
193. A writing can be a fraudulent misrepresentation. See PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 60, § 106 at 736.
194. Houses characteristically show variations in radon levels with the basement having
the highest radon levels. The radon levels decrease at higher stories. Gesell, Background At-
mospheric Radon-222 Concentrations Outdoors and Indoors: A Review, 46 HEALTH PHYS.
289, 296 (1983). For example, the Watras home (see supra note 6 and accompanying text)
had levels of radon at 1,600 pCi/I in the bedrooms, 2,400 pCi/I in the living room and 4,400
pCi/I in the basement. Smay, supra note 3, at 77.
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have lower radon levels and reporting these measurements as repre-
sentative of the entire home would be fraudulent. 95
Various remedies would be available if the purchase of the
home was the result of actionable fraud. Home buyers could rescind
the contract, 96 recover damages, or possibly sue for their increased
risk of cancer due to the radon exposure.
1 97
B. Representation, Without Knowledge, that a Radon Condition
Does Not Exist
Pennsylvania courts have also held that actionable fraud can be
found where the seller makes a material representation of fact with-
out knowledge as to the truth or falsity of the representation. 98 An
uninformed assertion that a house does not have a radon problem,
when in fact such a condition exists, may leave the buyer with an
action against the individual making the statement.
In Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffman Co., the lessor of a
store made the statement that the floors were "very, very strong."'' 99
In actuality, the floors were not capable of supporting any type of
business.2 °0 In addressing the issue of whether knowledge of the fal-
sity of the condition need be shown prior to recovery, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court stated: "[aibsolute knowledge of the defect need
not be shown, for if the defendant had no knowledge of the defective
condition of the floors, he should not have made the statement that
the floors were 'very, very strong'." '
In another case, Kelly v. Harrington, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that an action for fraud could be found when a business
arrangement was put forth as being sound, but was ultimately found
to be illegal.202 Although the defendant did not have knowledge of
the illegality, the court held "[a]s a general rule, if a person takes
upon himself to state as true that of which he is wholly ignorant, he
will, if it be false, incur the same legal responsibility as if he had
195. Galen, supra note 4, at 10.
196. See DeJoseph v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644 (1958) (in the case of fraud
with known falsity, a transaction is voidable even when the misrepresentation is not material).
197. See Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 318 Pa. Super. 90, 464 A.2d 1243
(1983); see also 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Fraud § 33 (1959).
198. The state of mind with which liability can attach without knowledge is a reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity, and is known as scienter. See PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS, supra note 60, § 107 at 41-45; see also 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Fraud
§ 7 (1959).
199. 397 Pa. 345, 350, 155 A.2d 363, 366 (1959).
200. Id. at 348, 155 A.2d at 365.
201. Id. at 350, 155 A.2d at 366.
202. 191 Pa. Super. 361, 156 A.2d 601 (1959).
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made the statement with knowledge of its falsity." 203
In the radon situation, the buyer of a home would have an ac-
tion for fraud if the seller states that the home is "radon safe" when,
in actuality, that seller had no knowledge of its radon condition. Ar-
guably, such a holding would only be logical. If the seller chooses to
represent his property as having certain characteristics, when, in
fact, it is unknown if those characteristics exist, that seller should
bear the risk of any subsequently discovered defects.
Even an innocent misrepresentation, made on an honest and
reasonable belief that those conditions actually exist, may afford the
buyer some relief. In the case of an entirely innocent misrepresenta-
tion, over an item material to the transaction, 04 the sale is voidable
at the buyer's option. 0 If a home is represented as radon free on the
basis of past and/or mistaken data, and it is subsequently discovered
that the home has a radon problem, the contract can be rescinded.
C. The Duty to Disclose
In Pennsylvania, the seller of a radon contaminated home would
have a duty to disclose this contamination to an unwitting buyer.
Pennsylvania courts have held that when a seller of a home knows of
a dangerous latent condition, the seller must disclose this condition.
Under ordinary circumstances, the seller of goods is under no
duty to disclose to the buyer information material to the purchase of
goods.2 06 At common law, a duty to disclose was imposed only in the
203. Id. at 365, 156 A.2d at 603 (citing Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa. 52, 17 A. 252 (1889)).
See also Adams v. Euliano, 299 Pa. Super. 348, 445 A.2d 788 (1982) (seller can be liable for
an innocent misrepresentation in a home sale when the seller is under a duty to know the
condition of the home); Glanski v. Ervine, 269 Pa. Super. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979) (material
misrepresentation could be found even where agent was unaware of termite problem in a
home). Cf. English v. Lehigh County Auth., 286 Pa. Super. 312, 428 A.2d 1343 (1981) (seller
can be liable for physical harm caused by negligent transmission of information when there
was no duty to speak).
204. A misrepresentation is material to the transaction if, but for the misrepresentation,
the transaction would not have been entered into. DeJoseph v. Zambelli, 329 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d
644 (1958). See also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 108 at 53-54. To be
material to the transaction, the factor need not be the sole inducement, only an important or a
significant factor in the transaction. Neuman v. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank, 356 Pa. 442, 454,
51 A.2d 759, 765 (1947).
205. If the fraud was knowing, the transaction is voidable by the buyer even in the
absence of materiality. If the misrepresentation was innocent, however, only a factor which is
material and basic to the bargain can result in the transaction being voidable. See Delahanty
v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 318 Pa. Super. 90, 464 A.2d 1243 (1983).
206. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 106 at 737; Note, Reed v.
King: Fraudulent Non-Disclosure of a Multiple Murder in a Real Estate Transaction, 45 U.
PITT L. REV. 877, 878 (1984); 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Fraud § 5 (1959). See
generally Keeton, Fraud - Concealment and Non-disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1936)
[hereinafter Keeton, Fraud].
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scope of a confidential relationship between the parties.10 7 In the
case of business transactions, confidential relationships did not exist
because the transactions were seen as being carried on at an arms
length.20 8
The rule of non-disclosure has been described as "unappetiz-
ing."20 9 As a result, the rule, like caveat emptor, has been eroded. 10
In Pennsylvania, an exception has been found that the seller of a
home must disclose the existence of a latent dangerous condition or
be liable for that condition's consequences.'
In Shane v. Hoffman, 12 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353.213 Shane involved a
207. 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Fraud § 5 (1959). Keeton summarily
stated the rule:
It is frequently stated in the decisions that the law imposes no duty on the
party to a transaction to disclose information in the absence of a confidential or
fiduciary relationship: such as, principal and agent, trustee and cestui, parent
and child, guardian and ward, and attorney and client. These confidential or
fiduciary relationships have been confined within narrow limits; as evidence of
this, it has been held that the relationship of tenants-in-common was not one
which carried with it this duty to speak; . . . .Certainly, it must be admitted
that these cases have been treated as exceptions to the rule that fraud requires a
misrepresentation, the argument being made that fraud requires a misrepresen-
tation only so long as no duty to speak has been imposed by law.
Keeton, Fraud, supra note 206, at 11-12. See also, e.g., Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 425
A.2d 412 (1981) (finding that a confidential relationship existed between an eighty-six year
old woman and a friend who purchased her land).
208. See supra note 207.
209. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 106 at 738.
210. Id.
211. The general exception in Pennsylvania law is described in 16 PENNSYLVANIA LAW
ENCYCLOPEDIA Fraud § 5 (1959):
An exception to the rule . . .[is when there is a] duty to speak . . . it has
been held that suppression of the truth amounts to a fraudulent representation
when a person knows that one is about to enter into a contract but fails to dis-
close a material fact unknown to the party . . .[who] ...is without means of
that knowledge.
Id. (emphasis added). See also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 106 at 739
(there has been a tendency to find liability when the plaintiff has no access to the truth).
212. 227 Pa. Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532 (1974).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965) states:
§ 353. Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Vendor
(I) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to per-
sons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land
with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the
condition after the vendee has taken possession if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the
risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or
should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will
not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Sub-
section (I) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity
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home seller's failure to disclose the fact that the basement of the
home was defective and had previously become flooded with sew-
age. 14 The court recognized that while "silence is not usually action-
able," a duty to speak may exist in certain circumstances.215 With
the adoption of § 353, the vendor of the home had a duty to disclose
anything known to him that would put the purchaser and his family
in danger of life and limb.216
This holding was reiterated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Quashnock v. Frost.2 7 In Quashnock, the vendor of a home and
the broker failed to disclose the fact that the home was infested with
termites. 8 While the Pennsylvania Superior Court continued to rec-
ognize that the vendor need not disclose every minor point to the
sale, § 353 and the Shane holding were again given credence.219 In
holding that a vendor must disclose termite infestation, the court
ruled that if the trial court determined that a condition was danger-
ous to others, that condition must be disclosed.220
Applied to the radon situation, these rulings clearly point to the
proposition that known radon contamination must be disclosed. The
trial court determines whether or not known radon levels constitute a
dangerous condition. Again, as with other determinations of defect,
the 4 pCi/l standard can be used as a baseline.221 Liability for fail-
ure to disclose a known condition would be equitable and lead to
more informed choices by buyers and less overall radon exposure.
This rationale has been applied in another jurisdiction in one of
the few cases dealing with radon. In Schnell v. Gustafson,222 the
purchasers of a home sued the home vendor for failing to disclose
that their home was built on uranium mill tailings. The Colorado
to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only
until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to
take such precautions.
Id. (emphasis added). Note that while this section applied to physical harm, the court in
Shane applied the section to find liability for economic loss to the premises.
214. Shane, 227 Pa. Super. at 180, 324 A.2d at 535.
215. Id. at 184-86, 324 A.2d 537-38.
216. Id.
217. 299 Pa. Super. 9, 445 A.2d 121 (1982).
218. Id. at 11-13, 445 A.2d at 121-22.
219. Id. at 19, 445 A.2d at 126 (quoting Annotation, Duty of Vendor of Real Estate to
Give Purchaser Information as to Termite Infestation, 22 A.L.R.3d 972, 975 (1969).
220. Quashnock, 299 Pa. Super. at 22, 445 A.2d at 127-28. Although the dissent in
Quashnock argued that there should be no liability because the situation was not latent, this
would not be a problem in a radon scenario. Because radon cannot be detected without special
devices, and because the tests take time to perform, reliance on non-disclosures would be justi-
fied because of the defect's latency.
221. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
222. 638 P.2d 850 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
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Court of Appeals held that an action of fraud and deceit was prop-
erly founded. 23 Although much of the court's holding deals with
lack of privity,224 the language also clearly points to a duty to dis-
close the presence of radon gas in the sale of a home. Because the
condition was a known latent defect,228 it was one that in equity and
all good conscience should have been disclosed.226
D. Liability of the Broker
The real estate broker may also be held liable for the sale of a
home with a known radon condition and for the representation that a
home does not have a radon problem.227 A real estate broker is a
well informed intermediary party and should therefore be under a
duty to disclose conditions that he knows of concerning the suitabil-
ity of the home.228 While most courts have focused on the knowledge
of the broker in determining liability,229 there is support for two op-
posing propositions. First, a broker has a duty only to respond and
inspect in answer to a direct concern expressed by the buyer. 230 Al-
ternatively, the broker has a duty to inspect and reveal all physical
defects in the property.231
Pennsylvania treats broker liability similarly to vendor liability.
If the broker knows of latent material defects, he must disclose these
defects.23 2 Similarly, if the broker makes a representation as to the
condition of the home, the broker can be held liable if the statement
223. Id.
224. The court noted that privity was not a problem. "This doctrine of contract law,
privity of contract, may not be used as a shield, in this tort action." Id. (citations omitted).
225. Id. The court also found justifiable reliance because the parties were in the market
for a home and had previously met. Id.
226. The fact that Gustafson involved mill tailings, a man-made latent defect, as op-
posed to a natural situation should be of little consequence. Courts have held a duty to disclose
defects even when the defect requiring disclosure was a condition or characteristic of the home
rather than a structural defect. See, e.g., Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App.3d 261, 193 Cal. Rptr.
130 (1983) (vendor has a duty to disclose the fact that a multiple murder took place on the
property).
227. "Buyers are beginning to sue ... real estate agents for non-disclosure. Galen,
supra note 4, at I.
228. See generally Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling De-
fective Housing, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1861 (1986) [hereinafter Broker Tort Liability]; Annota-
tion, Real-Estate Broker's Liability to Purchaser for Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure of
Physical Defects in Property Sold, 46 A.LR. 4th 546 (1986).
229. Annot., supra note 228, § 2a at 552.
230. Id. § 4 at 558.
231. Id. § 3 at 555.
232. See Long v. Brownstone Real Estate Co., 335 Pa. Super. 268, 484 A.2d 126
(1984); Quashnock v. Frost, 299 Pa. Super. 9, 445 A.2d 121 (1982); Glanski v. Ervine, 269
Pa. Super. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979). See also Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa. Super. 176, 324
A.2d 532 (1974).
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is made with reckless disregard as to the statement's truth or
falsity.23
Courts in Pennsylvania have found liability on the part of a bro-
ker when the broker does not disclose a dangerous latent defect. In
Long v. Brownstone Real Estate, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a real estate broker could be amenable to suit for failure to
disclose that the basement of a building was subject to frequent
flooding.23 4 The broker knew of the previous floodings but only told
the buyers that the home had a "water problem. '23 5 Because the
buyers were misled as to the extent of the water problem, they had a
cause of action for misrepresentation based on the broker's affirma-
tive representations and the broker's failure to disclose latent de-
fects. 236 Both the broker and the real estate company that the broker
represented were parties to the suit.
23 7
In the case of a home contaminated with radon, the broker
again faces possible liability if he misrepresents or fails to disclose. If
the home is known to be radon contaminated, the broker would have
a duty to disclose the condition. Additionally, the broker would have
the duty to make truthful representations as to radon levels of a
home under traditional fraud principles.
Such liability would be reasonable under the circumstances. A
broker is the supplier of information of conditions relating to the
sale, and economically, the broker is the most efficient information
provider.2 38 He, like the owner of the house, possesses access to in-
formation regarding the characteristics of the home. The broker is in
the bargaining position to request radon disclosure from the seller of
a home, and also possesses the time and resources to make a reason-
able test of the home.239
These factors become even more important when dealing with a
latent, dangerous condition such as radon. Requiring the broker to
be a broker of radon information would lead to lower exposure rates
233. See Slaybaugh v. Newman, 330 Pa. Super. 216, 479 A.2d 517 (1984); Shane v.
Hoffman, 227 Pa. Super. 176, 324 A.2d 532 (1974); Sprague v. Eastwood Realty Co., 119
P.L.J. 392, 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 440 (1971); Igoe v. Yori, 32 Leh. L.J. 528 (C.P. Lehigh Co.
1968).
234. 335 Pa. Super. 268, 484 A.2d 126 (1984).
235. Id. at 271, 484 A.2d at 128.
236. Id. at 271-72, 484 A.2d at 128-29.
237. In Long, the individual brokers who made the representation were named defend-
ants, individually and as representing the realtor. In addition, the real estate agency and its
owners were also named as defendants. Id. at 268, 484 A.2d at 126.
238. Broker Tort Liability, supra note 228, at 1867.
239. Id.; "[T~he broker usually is better able than the buyer to identify and obtain im-
portant information from the owner." Id. at 1868.
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on the part of home purchasers. Informed of radon contamination at
the outset, the purchaser of a home could take immediate remedial
steps. If uninformed, the buyer could face many years of harmful
radon exposure.
If the broker discloses a radon condition, subsequent liability
will not attach if the condition or remedial measures are more ex-
pensive than were reasonably contemplated. In Gozon v. Henderson-
Dewey Assoc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that once a
broker discloses the information known to him, he cannot be liable
merely because his statement of opinion as to the cost of repair
proves to be inaccurate. ' "
IV. Disclaimers
The potential for radon liability, under either breach of war-
ranty or misrepresentation theories, is likely to be high. With the
number of Pennsylvania homes expected to be affected by the prob-
lem,""1 and the high cost of remedial measures in certain circum-
stances 2 42 builders and vendors of homes can be expected to search
for means to transfer the risk of radon contamination to the buyer of
the home. The first line of defense in this regard will be disclaimers
of liability and inspection clauses s.24  To establish such defenses, the
builder would recite in the deed or contract of sale either that the
buyer takes the home "as is" or that the seller affirmatively dis-
claims any liability for the presence of unsafe levels of radon gas.
In real property transactions, such provisions have met with
mixed results." Precedents in Pennsylvania law, however, clarify
that the mere recitation of an "as is" inspection clause in the deed
will not be considered a valid defense for liability of the builder-
vendor founded in the implied warranty theory. The major Pennsyl-
vania case in this area is Tyus v. Resta.' 5 In Tyus, the buyer of a
240. 312 Pa. Super. 242, 458 A.2d 605 (1983) (broker held not liable for excess cost of
repairing defective pool when broker fully disclosed the existence of defective condition).
241. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 182.
243. See Galen, supra note 4, at 10.
244. "[Ciourts have displayed no favorable attitude towards disclaimers, construing
them away, or finding that they are not adequately brought home to the plaintiff." PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 97 at 692. See generally Note, Real Property - Implied
Warranty of Fitness and Habitability - Contract Language Stating No Warranties, Express
or Implied, is Effective Disclaimer of Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability in Sale
of New Homes by Builder-Vendor, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Real
Property - Disclaimer of Warranty].
245. 328 Pa. Super. I1, 476 A.2d 427 (1984). Pennsylvania previously had held that
disclaimers against liability for negligent acts are valid under limited circumstances. In War-
ren City Lines, Inc. v. United Refining Co., 220 Pa. Super. 308, 287 A.2d 149 (1971) the
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home sued on the implied warranty of habitability theory, claiming
that the warranty had been breached when the crawl space under
the home proved to have inadequate drainage.24 6 The contract of sale
for the home contained a provision that the home buyer had in-
spected the home or had "waive[d] the right to do so."24" The
builder-vendor of the home attempted to use this clause as a defense
in the action for breach of implied warranty." 8
The superior court, however, held that the builder-vendor could
not validly assert the "as is" inspection clause as a defense on an
action for breach of implied warranty concerning a latent defect of
the premises. 24 9 The strong public policy 25° reasons established for
adopting the warranty precluded a waiver of that warranty by broad
terms such as that recited in the contract of sale. An inspection
clause requires only reasonable inspection of the property, and an
undiscoverable latent defect falls outside such a clause.
2 51
In the radon situation, an inspection clause would have no ef-
fects on the buyer's rights. A mere general statement that the buyer
"has inspected the property" or takes the property "as is" would not
superior court held that a disclaimer would be seen as valid when I) it does not contravene
public policy; 2) it relates solely to private affairs; and 3) each party was free to bargain and
the contract is not one of adhesion. Id. at 311-12, 287 A.2d at 150-51. The court also stated,
regarding disclaimers of liability, that a greater tendency exists to void the disclaimer when
the party making the transfer is better able to prevent loss than the party receiving the trans-
fer and that party cannot realize the full extent of liability assumed. Id. It would seem likely
that these factors would also be considered when construing disclaimers of liability under the
implied warranty.
246. Tyus, 328 Pa. Super. at 16-17, 476 A.2d at 430.
247. The entire inspection clause in Tyus stated:
Buyer has inspected the property or hereby waives the right to do so and he
has agreed to purchase it as a result of such inspection and not because of or in
reliance upon any representation made by the Seller . . .and that he has agreed
to purchase it in its present condition unless otherwise specified herein. It is fur-
ther understood that this agreement contains the whole agreement between the
Seller and the Buyer and there are no other terms, obligations, covenants, repre-
sentations, statements or conditions, oral or otherwise of any kind whatsoever
concerning this sale.
Id. at 21, 476 A.2d at 432.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 25, 476 A.2d at 440-41.
250. The Tyus court echoed the broad public policy reasons of implied warranty estab-
lished by Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972). See supra notes 77-85 and
accompanying text. "As between the builder-vendor and the vendee, the position of the former
dictates that he bear the risk that a home which he built will be functional and habitable .
Tyus, 328 Pa. Super. at 19, 476 A.2d at 431.
251. Tyus, 328 Pa. Super. at 22, 476 A.2d at 433.
A reasonable pre-purchase inspection requires examination of the premises
by the intended purchaser-not by an expert. Defects which would not be appar-
ent to an ordinary purchaser as a result of a reasonable inspection constitute
latent defects covered by the implied warranties.
Id.
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cover radon because radon is clearly a defect so latent that a reason-
able pre-purchase inspection would not uncover unsafe levels of
gas.252 The builder-vendor has an opportunity to run lengthy pre-
purchase tests for radon, but the buyer, on a cursory examination,
would be forced to accept the property without having the ability to
enter into the agreement with full knowledge of the condition of the
property. Thus, the mere recitation of a general inspection clause in
a lease should not be seen as a wavier of the implied warranties of
habitability and workmanship when applied to radon defects.
Commentators on the effect of inspection clauses on implied
warranties support this result.2 3 When applied to latent defects, the
application of an inspection clause would be inequitable. It would be
unreasonable to hold, in a non-commercial setting, that a disclaimer
such as an inspection clause should apply to a defect which was un-
known to the buyer at the time of sale." This is doubly valid when
the defect is a condition such as radon. Given the serious health con-
sequences of radon, it is unlikely that a home buyer would actually
have accepted the home had he known of the problem and been
aware that his waiver encompassed the condition.
Strong public policy reasons exist for not allowing a general in-
spection clause to bar an action based on implied warranty. The im-
plied warranty was established because the builder-vendor possessed
a greater ability to inspect or prevent defects.2 55 As has been stated,
this public policy rationale applies to a latent health threat such as
radon as well as traditional structural defects.2"6 It would completely
defeat the purpose of the implied warranty, and the public policy
behind it, if the builder-vendor was allowed to disclaim any liability
for radon contamination merely through the recitation of a genera-
lized inspection clause in the deed. 57
Builder-vendors of homes, however, would be able to contract
away liability for radon contamination if the disclaimer was particu-
lar enough to evidence a clear intent of the parties to transfer the
252. An argument may be attempted that corollary to a ruling that a reasonable builder
should foresee the presence of radon, a reasonable buyer may also have the duty of conducting
a radon test in the course of a reasonable inspection.
253. See generally Note, Real Property - Disclaimers of Warranty. supra note 244;
Haskell, supra note 134; Note, Elderkin v. Gaster, supra note 79.
254. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, § 97 at 691.
255. See Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
256. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
257. One commentator stated that "[ilt would be a strange system that would allow the
buyer rights under the implied warranty of habitability and fitness and declare that his rights
can be taken away without his even having been aware of the loss." Note, Real Property -
Disclaimer of Warranties, supra note 244, at 686.
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risk for that particular defect. Although the Tyus decision held that
general inspection clauses were inapplicable to specific defects, the
superior court affirmatively stated that if the disclaimer clause was
clear and unambiguous as to the areas being disclaimed, then the
clause is enforceable. 258 The court stated:
To create clear and unambiguous language of disclaimer,
the parties' contract must contain language which is both under-
standable and sufficiently particular to provide the new home
purchaser adequate notice of the implied warranty protections
that he is waiving by signing the contract. To provide proper
notice, language of disclaimer must refer to its effect on specifi-
cally designated, potential latent defects. Evidence that the pur-
chaser and the builder-vendor actually negotiated the waiver
language in the parties' contract will tend to indicate that the
purchaser was aware of the contract's wavier language and its
import and accordingly, will tend to substantiate a valid
waiver.2 
89
Therefore, if the disclaimer of liability applies to a particular
latent defect, the buyer's cause of action under the implied warranty
can be barred. If the builder-vendor of homes wishes to relieve him-
self from possible liability, he can provide for a clear disclaimer in
the contract for sale. A statement in clear print providing that the
buyer assumes all responsibility for the particular defect of radon
would satisfy the requirements for a valid waiver of the implied
warranty.
260
The contract of sale between the builder-vendor and the buyer
would represent the intent of the parties and should be given full
faith and credit by the courts. Additionally, the mere presence of the
disclaimer of radon liability will put the buyer on notice that the
builder is making no representations that the radon in the home is
within safe levels. A reasonable buyer would be aware that radon
tests should be conducted rather than relying on the builder-vendor's
implied or express warranties. The ability to disclaim liability for
radon contamination would also alleviate some of the harshness
found in viewing radon as encompassed by the implied warranty.
The same radon disclaimer in a lease, even though particular
and unambiguous, would not be valid. While the implied warranty in
the sale of a home is founded on the builder's superior knowledge,
258. Tyus. 328 Pa. Super. at 21, 476 A.2d at 432.
259. Id. (citations omitted).
260. A clear statement of disclaimer would meet all of the burdens of waiver of liability
previously required by Pennsylvania courts. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
and can thus be freely contracted away, the implied warranty in a
lease is based on the superior bargaining position of the lessor. Any
attempt to disavow or waive that implied warranty has been seen as
an unconscionable contract of adhesion, and, therefore, the disclaim-
ing clause has not been given its full effect.
In Fair v. Negley, a tenant sued his landlord for breach of the
implied warranty when the home that he rented had a defective
water system. " " The landlord attempted to use a general "as is"
clause as a defense to the action.12 The superior court held that the
clause was invalid.163 The Pugh decision established that the implied
warranty was necessary because of the inferior bargaining position of
tenants seeking suitable living areas. 4 The exculpatory provision of
the "as is" clause failed for this same reason. The tenant was unable
to bargain for suitable housing. If exculpatory provisions were al-
lowed, tenants would be forced to accept the premises in uninhabit-
able conditions.263
Even when a disclaimer is clear, unambiguous, and particular to
the effect that liability for radon contamination is being disclaimed,
the clause would still be unenforceable under the Fair standard. The
freedom of bargaining aspect that makes a valid radon disclaimer
possible in the sale of a home is absent in the landlord-tenant con-
text. Thus, it would appear that a disclaimer which is valid in the
sale of a home would be ineffective in the rental of that same home.
Radon inspection clauses and disclaimers will also fail to bar
suits founded upon the fraud of the seller or lessor of the home. Con-
tract provisions which attempt to preclude an action for fraud have
generally proved inadequate." In Pennsylvania, a statement in a
lease or contract of sale that the owner of the home will not be held
liable for radon contamination will not be enforced when the owner
has failed to disclose a known radon condition or has misrepresented
the radon status of the home.
In National Building Leasing v. Byler, the buyer of a parcel of
land filed suit against the seller after discovering that the land had
261. Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978).
262. Id. at 55, 390 A.2d at 243.
263. Id. at 60, 390 A.2d at 245.
264. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1977).
265. Fair, 288 Pa. Super. at 57-58, 390 A.2d at 244-45. See also Galligan v. Arovitch,
421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966) (exculpatory clause in lease does not free landlord from
liability for negligence); Care v. Berger, 97 Dauph. Co. 356, 69 Pa. D. & C.2d 434 (1976)
(exculpatory clause not allowed in lease).
266. Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty by
which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property "As Is" or in the Condition in Which It Is, 97
A.L.R.2d 849, 849 (1964).
1150
RADON GAS
been filled with debris from homes which used to be located there.28 7
Although the contract of sale contained an inspection clause, the su-
perior court refused to give the clause its full credence.26 8 First, the
parol evidence rule allowed evidence of the misrepresentation to
modify the contract of sale because fraud was involved .2 9 Second,
because the defect was latent, the inspection clause did not preclude
justifiable reliance on the representations of the seller. 7°
Applied to the sale of a radon contaminated home, the recita-
tion of an inspection clause would not preclude an action based on
fraud or an action based upon the failure to disclose the latent haz-
ardous condition. As the court held in National Building, evidence
of fraud would be introduced, and the contract reciting the clause
modified. Further, all the traditional elements of the tort of fraud
would be present. Justifiable reliance would still be present because
radon is a latent condition, undiscoverable upon reasonable inspec-
tion. Thus the buyer had a right to rely on the misrepresentations of
the seller.
This analysis would not be altered by the fact that the lease
may contain a particular radon disclaimer rather than a general in-
spection clause. Although normally the disclaimer may shift the risk
of a radon problem to the buyer, that buyer still has justifiably relied
on the seller's representation that the home is "radon-safe."
V. Statutes of Limitation
A second line of defense likely to be used by the sellers of radon
contaminated homes against actions founded in breach of implied
warranty or fraud will be the statute of limitations . 17 Due to radon's
latent characteristics, it could be many years before a home buyer
realizes that his home has a problem and commences an action for
the cost of remedial measures or possibly for personal injury.
27 2
267. 252 Pa. Super. 370, 381 A.2d 963 (1977).
268. Id. at 376, 381 A.2d at 966.
269. Id. at 374, 381 A.2d at 965.
270. Id. at 375, 381 A.2d at 966. See also Nadolny v. Scoratow, 412 Pa. 488, 195 A.2d
87 (1963) (waiver clause in lease is not applicable to an action based on intentional misrepre-
sentation): Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffman, 397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d 363 (1959) (in-
spection clause in lease does not bar fraud action); Sprague v. Eastwood Realty Co., 119
P.L.J. 392, 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 440 (1971) (exculpatory provisions in agreement do not bar
action on the tort of fraud). Cf. Abrams v. Crown, 178 Pa. Super. 407, 116 A.2d 331 (1955)
(finding a justifiable reliance when misrepresentation caused inducement not to inspect).
271. See Sherman, supra note 4.
272. The personal injury aspect of the implied warranty of habitability has not yet been
addressed by the Pennsylvania appellate courts. Some jurisdictions, however, hold the builder-
vendor liable for personal injuries. See. e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965). See also generally Note, Elderkin v. Gaster, supra note 79. Under landlord ten-
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
Pennsylvania apparently would apply the four year contractual
statute of limitations to actions based upon implied warranty in the
sale of a home.273 This statute of limitations, however, will not be
strictly applied in an action for damages that were incurred in taking
remedial radon measures.
Pennsylvania has held, in cases involving defective construction,
that that statute of limitations begins to run when the defect could
reasonably be discovered, rather than when the contract is made. In
A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Building Corp., the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court held that the "discovery rule" is applicable to a defect in
the roof of a building.274 In Aberman, the owner of a shopping center
brought a suit for damages caused by the defective construction of a
roof.2 75 The defendant contractor asserted the defense of the six-year
contractual statute of limitations.2 76 The superior court, however,
held that whether the statute of limitations had run was a question
for the jury.27 Borrowing from personal injury precedents, the court
reasoned that the statute of limitations could only reasonably begin
to run after the owners had discovered the defect .2 7  The court
stated: "[i]n the case of a latent defect in construction, the statute of
limitations will not start to run until the injured party becomes
aware, or by reasonable diligence should have been aware of, the
defect. '
27 9
This rationale should be extended to the sale of a radon contam-
inated home. Strict application of a four year statute of limitations
to claims would do injustice to people who have been burdened with
a home which is uninhabitable. The statute of limitations would still
be applicable, however, when the buyer was on notice of an existing
ant actions personal injury suits would achieve greater success under a battery action or simi-
lar tort theory. See supra note 165. For fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure, RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353, adopted by Pennsylvania in Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa.
Super. 126, 324 A.2d 532 (1974), applied specifically to personal injury actions. The question
would involve major determinations by the Pennsylvania courts and as such is outside the
scope of this Comment although such a test case could conceivably involve radon exposure and
injury.
273. The applicable statute of limitations for an action based upon the implied warranty
in the sale of a home is an issue in itself and it is outside the scope of this Comment. Most
likely the four year limitations period of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5525 (1981) would apply, either
as an action based on a contract for the sale of a fixture or a general contract.
274. 278 Pa. Super. 385, 420 A.2d 594 (1980).
275. Id. at 388, 420 A.2d at 595-96.
276. Id. at 388, 420 A.2d at 596.
277. Id. at 393-96, 420 A.2d at 599-600.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 396, 420 A.2d at 599. But see Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law, the statute began running with the
performance of the contract).
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radon problem. If the home buyer is in a radon prone area and fails
to test for radon, the courts could view the buyer's failure to discover
the defect as unreasonable. In this case, the statute would begin run-
ning at the time the radon test should have been made. Suit on the
defect would also be barred if the action is not commenced within
four years of the discovery of a known radon problem.
The discovery rule would also apply to suits for personal injury
based on radon contamination. In Pennsylvania, actions for personal
injury damages must be brought within two years of the time of
their discovery. ° Pennsylvania, however, supports the proposition
that in "creeping disease cases,"'281 the statute of limitations begins
to run when the party knew of his injury and knew of the cause of
injury rather than when the person took his "first breath '282 of the
substance that caused his injury. The first breath rule, which courts
previously applied in other jurisdictions, states that the statutory pe-
riod begins to run when the victim took his first breath of the dan-
gerous item. 83 Pennsylvania, through a long line of asbestos cases,
has clearly rejected this rule.284 These cases hold that with injuries
caused by airborne health hazards, the statute of limitations begins
to run when the victim 1) had knowledge that he had been injured,
2) had knowledge of the operative cause of that injury, and 3) knew
of the relationship between the cause of the injury and some conduct
of the defendant.2 8 The victim should not wait until he develops a
specific disease such as cancer. Rather, the victim must sue for dam-
ages as soon as his exposure is discovered. 86
This principle has generally been applied in other jurisdictions
280. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(2) (1981) states:
The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two
years:...
(2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death
of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or
negligence of another.
281. "Creeping disease" is a term used in asbestos cases to describe slowly advancing
disease conditions that result from the inhalation of hazardous substances. See Cathcart v.
Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984).
282. See generally Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Prod-
uct Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279 (1977).
283. Id. at 281-82.
284. See Price v. Johns-Manville Corp., 336 Pa. Super. 133, 485 A.2d 466 (1984);
Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984); Staino v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 304 Pa. Super. 280, 450 A.2d 681 (1982); Anthony v. Koppers Co., 284
Pa. Super. 81, 425 A.2d 428, rev'd 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981). See also Birnbaum,
Statutes of Limitations in Environmental Suits: The Discovery Rule Approach, 16 No. 4
TRIAL 38 (1980). &
285. Hunsicker v. Conner, 318 Pa. Super. 418, 421, 465 A.2d 24, 26 (1983).
286. See Shadle v. Pearce, 287 Pa. Super. 436, 430 A.2d 683 (1981).
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to radiation injury cases.287 Radon induced cancers have a twenty
year latency period.288 The asbestos cases clearly emphasize that the
cause of action accrues when a victim realizes he has been exposed
to radon, rather than when a lung cancer or a stomach cancer devel-
ops. An argument could be made that radon exposure cases are dif-
ferent than asbestos cases because, in the radon situation, it seems
that the victim has no present injury. At least one jurisdiction has
held, however, that exposure to radon is a "present injury" which
gives the victim the right to begin a cause of action upon learning of
his exposure. In Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., homeowners filed
suit against the owners of a uranium processing mill. 289 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the mill had produced "mill tailings" and that
these tailings had been placed in the foundation surrounding their
home prior to its purchase.2 9 As a result, the home had levels of
radon gas in excess of government established standards.29' The de-
fendants moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs
had suffered no "present injury" on which to sue.292 The district
court, however, held that a present injury could be found. The court
stated:
While we all concededly suffer the possibility of chromo-
some damage as a result of exposure to carcinogens, the dam-
age, and the attendant increased risk, is proportional to the de-
gree of exposure. Here, because of the high levels of radiation to
which plaintiffs were exposed, the experts are able to conclude
with a reasonable degree of medical probability both that there
has been chromosomal damage and that such damage was
caused by the radiation. 9'
Therefore, the court denied the motion for summary judgment and
gave the plaintiff an opportunity to prove his injury in court through
the use of expert witnesses.
Statutes of limitation, as applied to radon cases, are not as com-
plex as they might initially seem. In suits to recover monies ex-
pended on remedial radon measures, the homebuyers would face a
four year statute of limitations. This statute begins to run when the
287. Levy, Radiation Litigation - The Emerging Tort Field, 25 TRIAL LAW. J. 568,
578-79 (1982). But see Garrett v. Raytheon, 368 So.2d 516 (Ala. 1979) (holding that the
limitations period begins to run when exposure occurs).
288. Murphy, supra note 25.
289. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Colo. 1984) (cited in Galen, supra note 4).
290. Id. at 15.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 17.
293. Id. at 17-18.
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home owner discovers or should reasonably have discovered that a
radon problem exists. In personal injury actions, the statutory period
is two years. This period commences when the plaintiff discovers his
radon exposure. The plaintiff need not and cannot wait until a can-
cer develops. Rather, the buyer should bring an immediate action
based on his present injury of an increased risk of cancer.
VI. Conclusion
With the increased awareness of the radon problem and the
hazards of radon exposure, Pennsylvania homeowners will find the
law a fertile ground for shifting the cost of remedial measures. This
liability, however, has reasonable limits. While the buyer of a new
radon contaminated home should have a cause of action under an
implied warranty theory against the builder-vendor of that home,
such liability will not extend to the sale of older homes by private
individuals. A person not in the market of selling homes should not
be held liable for radon contamination unless the seller misrepresents
the condition of the home or fails to disclose a known radon problem.
A specific radon disclaimer clause, which shifts the risk of radon
contamination to the buyer, would strongly mitigate a finding that
radon contamination falls within the builder-vendor's implied war-
ranty. Additionally, a reasonable application of the relevant statutes
of limitation would prevent stale claims from accruing against the
builder-vendor.
One broad theme runs through this analysis. Namely, radon gas
exposure should not be treated differently than other natural
problems which effect the value of real estate, such as soil instability
and flooding problems. Although radon gas is a new and hazardous
specter, the public policy reasons for placing liability on builder-ven-
dors, landlords and fraudulent sellers are as relevant with radon con-
tamination as they are with other defective home conditions. Addi-
tionally, because radon is a potential health threat of great
proportions, placing the risk of liability on these parties would pro-
mote detection and remedial action before residents suffer long term
irreversible damage to their health.
Donald A. Waltz

